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ABSTRACT 
 
 
LUSITANIA:  
AN EXAMINATION OF CAPTAINCY AND SEAMANSHIP IN THE FACE OF 
DISASTER 
 
August 2014 
 
Robert J. Goulding, B. A., Curry College 
M. A., University of Massachusetts  
 
Directed by Professor Paul Bookbinder  
The last voyage of the RMS Lusitania is examined. The Cunard liner left New York for 
Liverpool on May 1, 1915 as the conflict in Europe began to escalate.  The research 
separates the act of war from the actions of the ship’s command and control infrastructure 
and the seamanship of its crew. This distinction is made under a thesis that more lives 
could have and should have been saved. The central question of the research was 
therefore: to what extent should the captain and crew of RMS Lusitania be held to 
account for the elevated loss of life in the hostile sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915 
  
v 
and to what degree did this singular tragedy influence American public opinion toward 
the War.  
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This research recognizes that previous scholarship regarding the sinking of the Lusitania 
focused primarily on role of government in times of war and the complicit 
accountabilities for the sinking of a passenger ship. Historical records indicate that after 
World War I hostilities were brought to an end, Germany was formally determined to 
have been responsible for the sinking of the luxury passenger liner and the 1,198 lives 
that were lost. However, the political outcry and nationalistic demands for retribution in 
1915 shaped the speed, scope, and (most likely) the outcomes of the public and private 
inquiry into the disaster. In the ensuing years, many military historians have concluded 
that Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare was a primary catalyst for America’s 
entrance into the War. The sinking of the Lusitania was an early and devastating 
expression of Germany’s new policy that directly impacted the United States. 
 
The objective of this research is to separate the act of war from the actions of the ship’s 
command and control infrastructure and the seamanship of its crew. This distinction was 
made under a thesis that more lives could have and should have been saved.  
 
This research augments previous studies of the Lusitania and enhances or expands our 
historical understanding of the disaster. While histories of the Lusitania do not lay 
culpability at the feet of the crew and captain, this research found that both should be 
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held to account for the elevated loss of life in the hostile sinking of the ship on May 7, 
1915. 
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PREFACE 
 
The research method applied to this thesis involved primary English language 
sources from four countries including Great Britain, Ireland, and the United States, as 
well as translated documents from Germany’s war archives. Digitized versions of 
archived transcripts from various inquiries immediately following the disaster are also 
utilized in this research. In addition, critical primary sources cited in the research include 
firsthand accounts cataloged from adult and adolescent survivors. Their recollections of 
the pandemonium, the seamanship, and at times selfless heroism observed throughout the 
ship is occasionally referenced. In addition, the ships’ logs of both the Lusitania and U-
20 were thoroughly researched. By combining first hand accounts, ships logs, and 
testimony taken immediately following the Lusitania disaster, an intimate and unique 
understanding of the accountability of the captain and crew is contributed to the body of 
research already available to historians.  
Cunard company archival records located primarily in Liverpool, England were 
also researched to the fullest extent possible. This yielded details into how officers and 
crews were trained during the period and what precautions the Company mandated under 
circumstances of wartime operations. Cunard records also shed light on the liabilities and 
exposure the Company had at the time with regard to legal action from passengers and/or 
their families. The extent of that exposure and the means by which it was ultimately 
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remediated may reflect the accountability the company was perceived to place on its 
captain and crew. The career progressions of key employees such as Captain Turner were 
also be explored both before and after the accident and any changes in progression duly 
noted as an indicator of internal perceptions of competency. 
An analysis of how the conditions aboard the mortally damaged vessel 
exacerbated the breakdown in morale, crew training and the subsequent heavy loss of life 
will be reconstructed. A comparative study of similar examples of torpedoed passenger 
vessels will provide some calibrating reference to crew actions and attending losses. The 
fact remains that a large amount of material has already been written on the Lusitania but 
none so far has gone into too much detail regarding the actions of company executives 
before and after the tragedy, crew training and morale, the sometimes heavy-handed 
actions of Captain Turner and the men under his command during the tragedy. 
Some access to the war records involving Britain’s Naval High Command was 
considered in this research. However, most of the Admiralty’s record remains classified. 
A research trip to Liverpool (home of the Cunard Archives) is planned, but unfortunately 
will have to supplement the publication of this research. However, an understanding of 
what was ordered by the Admiralty was discoverable and proved essential to informing 
our primary thesis. One theory offered by some historians is that the Lusitania was 
sacrificed by desperate European leaders in the hope that the scope of the tragedy would 
infuriate a sleeping nation and help change the course of the First World War.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The storied luxury liner Lusitania was torpedoed to its grave by a German 
submarine patrolling twelve miles off the coast of Kinsale, Ireland on May 7, 1915. 
Sailing from American shores with 128 American passengers, the Lusitania’s tragedy and 
its immense loss of life may have catalyzed the American response to the war that would 
later become known as World War I. Most historians believe America’s entrance into 
World War I had a definitive effect on the outcome of the conflict and the shape of 
postwar Europe. Therefore, fully understanding the dynamics as well as the outcomes of 
the Lusitania tragedy is essential to understanding the evolution of the First World War 
and that war’s subsequent influence on the first half of the 20th century. 
The ship sank in less than 20 minutes despite advanced engineering intended to 
make it virtually unsinkable. Very few of Lusitania’s forty eight lifeboats were 
successfully deployed and 1198 of 1959 people aboard lost their lives, most never 
making it off the ship. Lusitania’s captain, William Turner was counted among the 
survivors. 
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At the time of the attack, the Lusitania was traveling from New York bound for 
Liverpool, England. It was public knowledge that German submarines were deployed in a 
lethal blockade around the British Isles. The route to Liverpool that the Lusitania took 
placed it in harms way, although she was without escort at the time of attack. As was the 
practice in wartime, merchant and civilian ships were given both general and ship-
specific instructions from the British Admiralty as to course headings, recent submarine 
activity, and evasive maneuvers.  
Extensive research has been conducted regarding the sinking of the Lusitania. 
Questions regarding what sank the ship, what warnings were given, and whether the ship 
was carrying wartime or otherwise explosive cargo have all been thoroughly covered. 
Though in some cases, not all questions have been answered definitively. 
The primary thesis of this research is that the derivative effect of the Lusitania’s 
sinking – the reflexive response of the American public to end its wartime isolation – 
may have been tempered had the loss of life in the disaster (including 128 Americans) not 
been so great. The central question to be answered therefore is:  
To what extent should the captain and crew of The RMS 
Lusitania be held to account for the elevated loss of life 
in the hostile sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915? 
To answer the central question, we must understand if a) the Captain and crew 
understood the threat, b) that they took all precautions that were available to them, c) they 
received and executed any orders from the Admiralty that conflicted with undertaking the 
precautions they believed necessary prior to being torpedoed, d) the ship’s leadership and 
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crew organized to deploy safety measures effectively given the grave circumstances after 
being directed to abandon ship, and e) public sentiment in the United States towards the 
war changed materially after the incident.   
The captain’s awareness of the threat is fundamental to the central question. If the 
captain and crew were ignorant as to the threat of attack, their actions up to encountering 
the submarine can hardly be criticized and we are left with only the post-attack response 
to evaluate. Previous research indicates the Captain and his crew were well aware of the 
threat posed by German submarines.
1
 Many passengers also expressed concern over the 
threat of submarine attack. Some canceled their passage.
2
 The German consulate in New 
York City issued a clear warning days before Lusitania’s departure that a blockade on 
Great Britain was in effect and that German vessels would consider any allied owned or 
operated ship passing through the blockade a target.
3
 
Once knowledge of the threat of attack was established, the research considered 
what precautions were taken against those that were available. These included the 
compliance of the ship’s cargo, the configuration of the ship’s bulkhead doors to 
minimize flooding, the ship’s course, speed, and position within the channel, and any 
requests for escort that had been issued and when they were made. To the extent that 
                                                 
1
 Thomas Bailey and Paul Ryan, The Lusitania Disaster: An Episode in Modern Warfare and Diplomacy 
(New York: New York Free Press, 1975), 128-129. 
2
 John Protasio, The Day the World was Shocked: The Lusitania Disaster and its Influence on the Course of 
World War I, (Havertown: Casemate Publishers, 2011), 9-20.  
3
 Thomas Bailey and Paul Ryan, The Lusitania Disaster, 70-74. 
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precautions taken did not exhaust those available to the Lusitania in 1915, the ships 
command or crew was held to account. 
With the British Admiralty sending shore-to-ship messages and most ships with 
explicit instructions NOT to respond (and thereby giving positions away to the enemy) it 
is unclear as to whether any overriding government orders were sent, were received, or 
were responded to. This is a critical secondary question to this paper’s thesis. If material 
orders were disobeyed, ignored, or poorly executed, then the accountability for the 
extensive loss of life rests squarely with the crew and its operating leadership. If, on the 
other hand, the orders were given, received, and executed, the accountability lay with the 
governments of the Allied forces under which whose protection the Lusitania sailed. The 
Americans refused to acknowledge the claims put forth by the German consulate as to its 
rights to blockade and to attack ships carrying neutral citizens with impunity. In effect, 
the American government refused to publicly acknowledge Germany’s warning.  After 
the incident, the American position only underscored the naive and potentially lethal 
delusion of neutrality. 
The research also considered the response of the ship’s personnel immediately 
following the torpedo strike. The central question as to whether or not casualties could 
have been materially reduced was perhaps most influenced by the crew’s ability to 
transfer passengers off the ship quickly and safely. The crew’s performance under the 
circumstances that were presented on that morning may be a most critical element in 
validating the central thesis.  
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Finally, an examination of American sentiment before and after Lusitania was 
destroyed was necessary to establish the role for which the liner’s loss of life played in 
the American entrance into the war.  Recognizing the American press as both a primary 
influence as well as a registrar of public sentiment, newspaper coverage of the Lusitania 
as well as various public proceedings were also analyzed.   
The Threat 
Previous research indicates that the Captain and his crew were well aware of the 
threat posed by German submarines. Many passengers also expressed concern over the 
threat of submarine attack. Some canceled their passage. The German consulate in New 
York City issued a clear warning days before the Lusitania’s departure that a blockade of 
Great Britain was in effect and considered any allied ship passing through the blockade a 
target. Furthermore, British code-breakers had intercepted a German command to put 
three U-boats to sea with orders to “attack transport ships, merchant vessels, warships”4  
in the Bristol Channel.  Finally, wireless warnings from shore had been sent (and 
acknowledged by Lusitania) indicating that a submarine had been sighted off the 
southern Irish coastline and that three civilian ships had already been attacked and sunk 
in the days leading up to May 7, 1915.  
Despite the apparent awareness of the general threat, little research currently 
exists as to why more precautions weren’t put in place prior to setting sail and as the 
Lusitania approached warzone waters. Some historians have suggested the Lusitania was 
                                                 
4
 Thomas Bailey and Herman Bauer and Walther Schwieger, “German Documents Relating to the 
Lusitania,” The Journal of Modern History 8 no.3 (1936): 324. 
4
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perhaps a pawn in the chess game between Germany and Great Britain. This paper only 
considered the extent to which precautions were – or were not - taken and will leave the 
motivations of the various parties to other historical scholars. 
Precautions  
Despite its status as an iconic target, the Lusitania was not afforded an escort. 
Rescue ships took hours to arrive on the scene to search for survivors. Controversy 
remains as to how a single torpedo could have brought down this mighty ship. It appears 
that wartime cargo was indeed in the hold and may have caused the second, more deadly 
blast. Had the contraband cargo been removed as a precaution prior to departure from 
New York, many more lives may have been saved and Germany’s reasons for sinking her 
would have been made moot. 
Orders 
Historians point to two public inquiries held immediately after the sinking of the 
Lusitania as evidence that certain secret orders sent directly to Captain Turner from the 
British Admiralty were ignored by the ship’s bridge.5 At the time of the testimony, the 
alleged orders could not be revealed since England was still very much at war. This 
research contributes a more transparent set of evidence of what orders were received and 
acted upon by the Captain and crew. 
Attack 
                                                 
5
 Thomas Bailey and Paul Ryan, The Lusitania Disaster, 194-195. 
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German and British public war records have informed details of U-20’s attack on 
the Lusitania.  This includes the diary of German U-boat Captain Schwieger as well as 
the Mersey Inquiry; a public investigation conducted one month after the attack.  
Although the crew of the passenger liner had assumed the high alert stations ordered by 
Turner, only one seaman spotted the torpedo with sufficient time to have the ship take 
evasive action.  Unfortunately, the alert was never acknowledged to have been received 
and the seaman subsequently left his post to warn other crew members –including his 
brother – who were below deck.6 
For its part, the submarine crew was surprised by the appearance of the Lusitania 
in its periscope sight.  The U-20’s captain reported that he had not expected to see any 
shipping traffic in the area since his crew distinguished itself as an active predator by 
sinking two ships the day before. He would write in his diary at the time that finding the 
30,000 ton passenger steamer anywhere other than the Northern Channel, “was a 
mystery.” Furthermore, the ship had been dismissed when initially spotted as it was 
moving away from the U-20 at a speed nearly twice that of the submarine. The 
Lusitania’s sudden change in course indeed surprised the submarine’s captain as she 
abruptly turned towards the U-20’s line of sight.7 Furthermore, the ship’s markings had 
been painted over and she flew no flag. The Lusitania was identified only as a large, four-
                                                 
6
 A Formal Inquiry Ordered by the Board of Trade into the Loss of the Steamship Lusitania, (1915) 2d, sess 
97. accessed August 20, 2013, http://www.titanicinquiry.org/Lusitania/02Header.php 
7
 Thomas Bailey and Herman Bauer and Walther Schwieger, “German Documents Relating to the 
Lusitania”,  335.  
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stack, two-mast passenger steamer before being fired upon.
8
 The torpedo struck at 
roughly mid-ship between boiler rooms 1 and 2.  A second explosion observed by the 
crew of the U-20 was of unknown origin and remains so to this day. The ship’s identity 
was revealed to the crew of the U-boat only shortly after the first explosion. The ship 
then sank in less than twenty minutes. 
Abandon Ship  
Research into the proceedings once the determination was made to abandon ship 
is less developed than most elements of The Lusitania’s sinking. The fact of the matter is 
that the lifeboats represented the only means to leave the ship safely and most were left 
intact as the ship sank. Panicked passengers overloaded several boats. Many lifeboats that 
were deployed never reached the water with passengers aboard.
9
 The ship listed at such 
an angle that several boats were torn apart against the rivets protruding from the 
Lusitania’s hull.10 
Whereas previous research placed little emphasis on the performance of the crew 
within the context of the disaster, this research contributes a fresh lens onto the failure to 
deploy lifeboats safely and effectively. It answers the question as to whether that failure 
was a function of circumstance, incompetence, or cowardice. 
Rescue & Recovery 
                                                 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Diana Preston,  Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy (New York: Walker Publishing Company, 2002), 218-220. 
10
 Diana Preston,  Lusitania, 222. 
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Research into the rescue and recovery operations relies heavily on first person 
accounts.  A lack of lifejackets and the temperature of the water doomed those not 
fortunate enough to have secured a place on a lifeboat. The British Navy’s assets were 
docked at Queenstown over two hours away, when Lusitania’s distress calls began 
coming in.  Private fishing boats were among the first to arrive on the scene. Most of the 
victims were never recovered.  This indicated that many were either trapped on the ship 
or unable to swim far enough away from it to avoid being dragged down in the 
undercurrent of the Lusitania as she sank to the bottom off the south Irish Sea.  The crew 
was unable to keep Lusitania afloat long enough for many of those in the water to escape. 
American Reaction 
For many Americans, the Lusitania tragedy had the effect of putting a suddenly 
intimate lens on a very distant war.  The research conducted follows the story 
development of the New York Times before and after the disaster.  Comparing and 
contrasting the continuity of coverage of the largest newspaper in the country at the time 
can reasonably serve as a proxy for public sentiment.   
It would be almost two years after the Lusitania disaster before the United States 
entered the war.  Despite the loss of 128 out of 171 American passengers, the Lusitania 
did not elicit an immediate nor direct move toward war.  It did however, change the 
trajectory of American sentiment. 
The sinking of the Titanic three years before had educated the public and 
Lusitania’s designers to believe that a virtually unsinkable ship could be built.  The safety 
provisions such as lifeboat capacity –entirely a response to Titanic’s shortcomings – were 
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well beyond the occupancy of the ship. Weather was calm and the submarine threat 
known rather precisely. 
Yet somehow the fastest passenger ship in the world was tracked down and sunk 
by a single German U-boat while the ship was under the careful and confident control of 
the British Admiralty.  The loss of life was staggering – nearly two thirds of the 
passengers and crew on board.  Public sentiment immediately following the disaster was 
focused on reconciling Lusitania’s reputation with its demise.   The German brutality on 
the other hand, surrendered to the back pages of early editions and then disappeared 
entirely.  What Lusitania did do, is educate Americans as to the collateral implications of 
Europe’s war and the grave limitations of neutrality. 
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CHAPTER I I   
KNOWLEDGE OF THE THREAT 
 
In the late morning hours of May 1, 1915, the Lusitania, a British luxury ocean 
liner of some 785 feet in length and tipping the scales at over 30,000 (30,396) tons, began 
taking on passengers, cargo, and the necessary provisions of a ship of her caliber headed 
out on the uncertain North Atlantic. Knowledge of an imminent threat of attack to any 
naval or merchant ship traveling near England’s coast was widespread. Germany’s 
imperial command issued a warning to merchant vessels traveling in the English channel 
in February of 1915.  
“All the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the 
whole of the English Channel, are hereby declared to be a war zone. 
From February 18 onwards every enemy merchant vessel found within 
this war zone will be destroyed without it always being possible to 
avoid danger to the crews and passengers.  Neutral ships will also be 
exposed to danger in the war zone, as in view of the misuse of neutral 
flags ordered on January 31 by the British government, and owing to 
the unforeseen incidents to which naval warfare is liable, it is 
impossible to avoid attacks being made on neutral ships in mistake for 
those of the enemy.” 
Germany Imperial Command 
February 4, 1915 
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Germany had deployed its submarine fleet to patrol the waters around Great 
Britain and Ireland to blockade shipments of supplies to England and its allies.  In theory, 
blockading Britain was sound war strategy as it was a highly industrialized island-nation 
dependent on its colonies and other trading partners for the resources necessary to power 
its economy and war machine. Britain therefore had a large merchant fleet that reflected 
this maritime dependency.  To protect and extend its colonies and trade routes, Britain 
had amassed the largest and most powerful navy in the world.   
Germany’s blockade would prove increasingly effective as the war went on.  Its 
effectiveness corresponded to the build-up of its submarine fleet and Britain’s increased 
need for imported war materials. It was so effective in fact, that England’s First Lord of 
the Admiralty, Winston Churchill announced a program to outfit large merchant ships – 
including first class British liners – with 4.7 inch caliber guns at the bow and stern. By 
March 17, 1914, the British House of Commons understood that forty merchant ships had 
been so armed. In his report to the House of Commons, Churchill projected that by the 
end of the following fiscal year (March 31, 1915) the armament program would have 
outfitted some seventy ships. In addition to the armaments, all armed merchant cruisers 
would be commissioned by the Admiralty as ships of the Royal Navy.  As such, this 
declaration meant that these ships – which could include the Lusitania – would 
consequently be indistinguishable in status and control from men of war.
11
 
                                                 
11
 Thomas Bailey and Paul Ryan, The Lusitania Disaster, 12. 
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Although the armaments were claimed to be defensive in nature, their effect was 
to change the rules of naval engagement and ultimately widen the conflict to include 
previously neutral countries such as the United States. Submarine technology (as a 
weapons system) at the outbreak of World War I was new and relatively primitive.  A 
large, armed merchant cruiser had the speed and agility and now in some cases (ships 
outfitted with guns) the firepower to cripple or destroy a surfaced submarine.
12
 What is 
clear from the record is that the British Admiralty’s program to arm merchant ships and 
commercial liners was intended to disrupt the effectiveness of Germany’s submarine 
warfare.  The specific orders given to all merchant vessels and liners at the outbreak of 
war were to not resist armed enemy warships. Churchill’s program to arm merchant 
vessels revised the instructions given to British merchantmen to engage the lightly armed 
German submarines using all methods of resistance including ramming the submarine at 
full speed, if the opportunity presented itself. 
The narrow scope of Churchill’s armament program (targeting submarines and 
warships such as merchant raiders), the urgency and speed of its deployment, and the 
public nature of its disclosure all seem to underscore the knowledge of an imminent 
threat of submarine attack was pervasive within Britain’s war apparatus. That knowledge 
was now being projected into the public sector. Therefore it seems all but certain that the 
Cunard cruise line and the captain of the Lusitania must have been well aware of the 
threat before she set sail from New York.  What they may not have anticipated was the 
German response to Churchill’s program. 
                                                 
12
 Thomas Bailey and Paul Ryan, The Lusitania Disaster, 13. 
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Germany’s response to the Admiralty’s disclosure of an armament program for 
merchant ships further escalated the threat level at the time of Lusitania’s departure. 
Although the British government purposely did not disclose whether or not Lusitania had 
yet been fitted with the armaments specified by the Admiralty (it hadn’t), Germany had 
little choice but to assume it had. In fact, the German Embassy in New York went to the 
extraordinary length to warn the public that it considered any ship sailing St. Georges 
channel a target for destruction.
13
 Germany also unilaterally changed the rules of naval 
engagement regarding submarines. Merchant vessels would no longer receive a warning 
nor time to affect an effort to abandon ship. This new rule would be this change that 
would in the end, have a profound impact on the fate of the Lusitania. 
On the morning of May 1, 1915, passengers began arriving on New York City’s 
Pier 54 along with their belongings and baggage to be loaded onto the Lusitania for its 
return voyage to Liverpool. Rumors had been circulating among the public for many 
weeks that the Lusitania would be sunk on one of its crossings of the Atlantic. Both she 
and her converted-troopship sister the Mauretania were rumored to have been marked for 
destruction by the German government. The underlying logic behind the rumor was 
intuitive. Both ships were built for speed and the ability to transport large numbers of 
people across vast ocean distances. The enormous casualties being experienced (by both 
sides) meant the Allies’ appetite for new troops and weaponry would seem insatiable. 
Lusitania and Mauretania were believed to be unique tactical assets in a long ground 
                                                 
13
 Julian Corbett,  Official History of the War: Naval Operations. Vol. II (UckField, East Sussex: Naval and 
Military Press Ltd, 2009), 260.  
13
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war. Steps taken by the German Consulate in New York City hadn’t helped dispel the 
rumor, as it had issued a warning in the “New York Times” and several prominent 
newspapers that read as follows: 
Travelers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are 
reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her 
allies and Great Britain and her allies; that the zone of war 
includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that, in 
accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial German 
Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain or any of 
her allies, are liable to destruction in those waters and that 
travelers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or 
her allies do so at their own risk.  
German Consulate New York City, New York Times, May 1, 
1915 
Along with the published warnings in American newspapers, Germany’s 
submarine fleet was actively engaging ships in the waters off the southern shore of 
Ireland – Lusitania’s planned route to Liverpool, England. In the two days preceding 
Lusitania’s departure from her American port of call, German submarines sank the Earl 
of Lathom, the Candidate, and the Centurion. Each of these ships had been navigated on 
Lusitania’s sail-path toward St Georges channel. 
Therefore, in the case of the Lusitania, contributing to the threat was the fact that 
Germany had already created a highly effective kill-zone through which Lusitania would 
have to pass on its voyage from New York to Liverpool.  Germany may have suspected 
that Lusitania was armed with guns capable of sinking her submarines – a weapons class 
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she had fully deployed and had only a limited number of (18) at the time.  In fact, at the 
outbreak of the war, Germany had the smallest submarine fleet among all combatants.  
Ironically, England’s alleged armament program may have had the opposite of its 
intended effect. The program may have further incentivized - rather than detoured - 
Germany’s motivation to attack merchant ships and liners. The German calculus would 
have been that any reduction in force of the submarine fleet would translate to an increase 
in force for the British and her allies, since submarines had shown to be a particularly 
effective means of enforcing the blockade of English supplies.  As it would later prove 
out, the Germans’ fears of the potency of armed commercial vessels against her 
submarines was quite correct.  See Exhibit I. 
 
 
Exhibit I 
British Merchant Ships Armed 
Merchant Ships 
Unarmed 
Merchant Ships 
Number vessels attacked 310 302 
Sunk by torpedoes without warning 62 30 
Sunk by gunfire or bombs 12 205 
Escaped 236 67 
Pct. Escaped 76% 22% 
 
Published by British Admiralty 
Activity from January 1, 1916 to January 25, 1917 
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Churchill’s very public announcement in the English Parliament of the armament 
program may have actually increased the threat of attack on the Lusitania (and all 
merchant ships). Whether or not it increased the threat, the program undoubtedly raised 
the casualty rate per engagement by altering the conduct of submarine warfare.  The 
cases of two liners - the Falaba and the Lusitania - illustrate this critical transition by the 
Germans and it quickly diffused across all navies involved in the war. 
Nine months after fighting had erupted in August 1914, the death toll on the 
battlefields of Europe stood in the millions. There would be many more casualties to 
follow over the next three years. At the time the Cunard-owned Lusitania pulled away 
from her moorings in New York for the last time, a punishing stalemate had descended 
across Europe. These ground conditions heightened the importance of securing supply 
lines that could withstand a prolonged conflict. Both the Allied and Axis powers realized 
that a disruption in supplies could therefore tip battlefield conditions. The British and 
German navies were responsible for affecting such a disruption. It is therefore not 
surprising that the inexhaustible bloodshed was not limited to the battlefields. Multiple 
naval clashes had already taken place involving expensive new weapon systems for the 
time.  The chosen weapons of this new scope of war would in effect herald the beginning 
of unheard losses among not just military personal but civilian passengers at sea as well.  
In November of 1914, Great Britain mined and blockaded the North Sea. This in 
turn effectively blocked German ports from receiving foreign assistance and trade.  In 
response, the German Admiralty declared that the British Isles were to be a designated 
war zone as of February 4, 1915. Germany elaborated that if any ship belonging to Great 
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Britain or her allies were found by German maritime or military craft within the declared 
war zone it would be destroyed by the most fearsome naval weapon conceived up to that 
time - the submarine.
14
 
 A German submarine was the most likely threat to attack a British built and 
owned ship such as the Lusitania in May of 1915. Several smaller British passenger ships 
had been attacked and sent to the bottom in previous months. One such vessel was the 
S.S. Falaba, a cargo-passenger ship of some 5,000 tons which sank on March 28, 1915. It 
sank in only eight minutes after a single torpedo fired from the German submarine U-28 
struck its engine room.
15
 
Although there are many similarities between the two ships, one important 
difference between the Falaba sinking and that of the Lusitania a little over a month 
later, was that the Commander of the U-28 (Baron Forstner) allowed time for the 
passengers of the Falaba to climb into and launch the lifeboats of the doomed ship after 
being warned by a surfaced U-28. However, as passengers loaded into lifeboats, the 
officers onboard began sending up rescue flares and broke the German-imposed radio 
silence by sending wireless messages to surrounding ships.  The U-28 captain viewed this 
as a breach of his agreement to spare Falaba’s crew and passengers and therefore cut 
short the doomed ship’s time to abandon ship. Although the time between the Falaba 
being warned and the firing of the torpedo vary widely between British and German 
accounts (7 minutes, and 23 minutes respectively), it seems neither was adequate to 
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prevent 104 lives (of 242 onboard) from being lost in the resulting panic as the ship 
quickly submerged.
16
 
A month later in the conflict, German submarine commanders would abandon the 
customary and humanitarian practice of warning ships before they were sunk because of 
the increased probability that the warned vessels would either be secretly armed with 
hidden deck guns or that they would charge at full speed towards the U-boat with the 
intention to ram it. This change in the rules of engagement would be exemplified in the 
case of the R.M.S. Lusitania. The speedy British liner was sunk after a single torpedo was 
fired from the U-20 which avoided warning the unsuspecting liner of the need to load and 
launch the lifeboats.
17
 
The humanitarian value of the warning of impending attack previously afforded 
British merchant ships by German submarines is intuitive. The 100 casualties resulting 
from the sinking of the Falaba represented 42% of its passengers and crew.  Whereas the 
1,198 lives lost from the Lusitania disaster reflected nearly two thirds of the men, 
women, and children on board. Both ships had approximately the same amount of time 
(15 - 20 minutes) from the moment of realization that the vessel would be/was torpedoed 
to its sinking below the waves.  Of course other factors would have influenced the 
relative loss of life such as the availability of rescue ships, weather conditions, and the 
conduct of the abandoned ship proceedings.  Its worth noting that the Falaba was able to 
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release 3 of 4 of its lifeboats whereas Lusitania only 6 of 22. Certainly the warning issued 
by the German submarine to the Falaba explains some of the difference between the 
casualty rates.  The Falaba incident proved to be a turning point in the conduct of 
submarine warfare and indeed in World War I itself. 
It should be noted however that with both ships having approximately the same 
brief time to abandon ship, Falaba saved 138 lives while Lusitania’s crew was able to 
save 761.  Lusitania’s ability to launch twice the number of lifeboats and save nearly six 
times the number of passengers and crew is testimony to her crew, particularly under the 
circumstances of a surprise attack. 
The Lusitania was traveling at 18 knots when the torpedo hit while the Falaba 
was at full stop having heeded the warning issued by the surfaced submarine.  It would 
take several precious minutes before Lusitania could be slowed enough to safely launch 
her lifeboats.  Additionally, Lusitania’s response was hampered by an immediate and 
severe heel to its starboard side and simultaneous submersion of the bow.
18
 This rendered 
most if not all of her port side lifeboats useless. The bow’s submersion also meant that 
starboard side lifeboats had immense difficulty loading and then lowering safely (stem 
and stern even with the waterline).  Many fully-loaded lifeboats on the starboard side 
foundered immediately and sent passengers into the sea. The Fabala in contrast, loaded 
and lowered her lifeboats under nearly ideal conditions with its crew’s full attention 
toward abandoning the ship simply because it had been given clear and ample warning 
from its attacker.   
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While the captain and crew of the Lusitania knew well the general threat of a 
submarine attack along the route they were to travel, they were not given warning of 
imminent attack from U-20 Captain Schwieger that had been customary and may have 
saved countless lives.  That custom had been ceased unilaterally by the Germans in part 
because of the British Admiralty’s announcement of the broad merchant ship armament 
program that appeared to target specifically the vulnerabilities of German submarines. 
The suspension was also influenced by the fact that several submarines had been 
damaged, sunk, or outrun by evasive maneuvers by merchant ships that took advantage of 
the restricted attack policies initially followed by German submarine officers. By the 
Spring of 1915, the gloves were coming off of the newest naval weapons system. This 
development would have grave implications to merchant and military ships in the 
northern Atlantic for the remainder of the war as well as wars to follow.  
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CHAPTER III  
PRE-VOYAGE PRECAUTIONS 
 
The sudden advent of submarine warfare made what was once a relaxing trip to 
lands afar, now a somewhat dangerous affair. Willing passengers would be traveling at 
their own risk and exposing themselves, their loved ones, and their property to the 
possibility of destruction. The threat of a submarine attack may well have been in the 
back of many of the passenger’s minds as they handed their ticket to the purser and 
boarded the ramp into the Lusitania’s interior that morning. This anxiety was likely 
exacerbated by the advertising agency that the German Consulate had hired to create and 
issue an explicit warning to the American traveling public. Instead of showing up in the 
newspapers a full two weeks ahead of the Lusitania’s departure as was originally 
planned, the warning was measurably delayed and issued on the morning of the ship’s 
departure.  At that point, passengers had little time to secure let alone read a newspaper. 
Those that had seen the warning relied on the ship’s crew for interpretation and 
reassurance since there was little time to find alternative passage.  
One couple - Mr. and Mrs. Grab - didn’t see the warning until after they had 
boarded the ship, but were reassured by the words of Chief Purser James McCubbin.  
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McCubbin stated that the ship was too fast to be caught.
19
 Another couple, Theodore and 
Belle Naish had read the warning only after the ship had pulled out of the harbor, but had 
decided to ignore it. Mr. Naish convinced himself and Mrs. Naish that if the warning had 
been official and had been sent through the proper channels “each American passenger 
would have had warning sent and delivered before boarding the vessel.”20 
 Several passengers joked about the possibility of the Lusitania being sunk with 
them on it. One of those amused passengers was Elbert Hubbard. The famous writer even 
welcomed the possibility of perishing in an attack as he explained to a reporter that he 
believed that such a death would capitalize on his literary works and “launch him into the 
Hall of Fame”.21 Some passengers seemed to have received extraordinary means by 
which they were encouraged not sail on the Lusitania. This notion is best illustrated by 
the experience of one very prominent passenger, Alfred G. Vanderbilt. Vanderbilt had 
inherited the vast fortune of his family’s railroad empire and was easily one of the 
wealthiest passengers on board the luxury liner. Vanderbilt had received an anonymous 
telegram while unpacking on the ship in his suite. The message had read “THE 
LUSITANIA IS DOOMED. DO NOT SAIL ON HER” it was signed “MORTE,” 
Vanderbilt shrugged the message off that it was “somebody trying to have a little fun at 
my expense.”22 
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A Boston bookseller named Charles Lauriat decided to continue with the boarding 
procedure despite reading the warning issued in the newspapers and feeling uneasy about 
the departure.  Earlier when he had purchased his ticket from Cunard’s Boston office, 
Lauriat had asked the official in charge whether the Lusitania would receive an armed 
escort on its arrival into the designated war zone and in response was told: “Oh yes! 
Every precaution will be taken.”23  
For the most part, those traveling on the Lusitania seemed to downplay the 
German Consulate’s warning. Eyewitnesses say they were encouraged to do so by the 
ship’s captain and crew. A handful of people did cancel passage. However, this was not 
an unusual number of cancelations for such a trip.  Regardless of public perceptions, the 
Admiralty under which whose authority the Lusitania now sailed, understood fully the 
elevated nature of the threat in May of 1915. In the three months prior, forty eight British 
merchant ships had been sunk by German submarines as Table II indicates. 
Table II 
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Month,  1915 British Ships Sunk by 
German Blockade 
   Feb,  1915 14 
   Mar,  1915 23 
   Apr,  1915 11 
Total 48 
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Design, Engineering, and Outfitting 
 
As a modern cruise liner of the time, Lusitania benefited from lessons learned out 
of the Titanic disaster in 1912 and the Empress of Ireland in 1914. The Titanic had 
inspired new regulations that required every British passenger liner to have enough life 
boats to accommodate all on board, including the crew. This was not the case with 
Titanic which carried only twenty lifeboats for more than twenty two hundred 
passengers.
24
 One of the most important pre-voyage precautions met by Lusitania was its 
lifeboat count: a capacity that exceeded the actual passenger and crew count by over six 
hundred people.
25
 This meant that up to one third of the lifeboats could be inoperative or 
otherwise compromised and all of the passengers and crew could still be safely 
accommodated. In Lusitania’s case, even this safety margin proved insufficient as only a 
fraction of her seventy boats were safely boarded and launched. Its important to note that 
although Lusitania indeed benefited from earlier disasters such as Titanic, there were 
limits to those benefits because Lusitania was structurally an older design.  Therefore the 
changes had to be retrofitted and their effectiveness was somewhat compromised in 
comparison to new ships.  
Another noteworthy precaution was the Lusitania’s engineering. The ship had 
been constructed by the Scottish shipbuilding firm John Brown and Company Ltd. from 
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August of 1904 to September of 1907. From the Brown shipyard located at Clydebank, 
Scotland and on the River Mersey slightly downstream from the port city of Liverpool, 
the Lusitania took shape. The company built a ship with several features considered 
revolutionary for the time and all of which afforded their existence to the Lusitania being 
partly owned by the British government.  
The Lusitania’s primary owner - the Cunard Line - had entered into a contract 
with the British government in July of 1903. The agreement stipulated that the British 
would pay 2.6 million pounds for the construction of two massive transatlantic ships in 
the form of a 20 year loan.
26
 A sum of one-hundred and fifty thousand pounds a year 
would be paid to Cunard for the upkeep and maintenance of the ships. This contract was 
not without safeguards, for Cunard was required to remain an English-owned company, 
the two ships (Lusitania and sister ship Mauretania) would be required to carry mail and 
passengers across the Atlantic, and the British Admiralty was to have complete final 
approval of the ship’s designs before construction was to commence.27 
The British Admiralty was adamant when it came to the right of building the ships 
to a government specification since the possibility existed that - in the time of war - the 
operation of either or both could be handed over to the British Navy upon their request to 
be used as merchant cruisers or troopships in the defense of the British Empire. The 
anticipation of this possible future for the ships most certainly influenced aspects of their 
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design. Ultimately, the construction would have to be consistent with ships that could be 
effectively and quickly converted to ones operated by naval personnel as ships of war. 
These design precautions would in turn have serious consequences for the Lusitania some 
eight years after her launch. 
  In accordance with Admiralty specifications, Lusitania had been constructed 
with a double hull and eleven traverse watertight bulkheads.  This double hull design had 
the effect of protecting the ship from a breach to the outer plating. The bulkheads served 
to divide Lusitania into twelve compartments below the lower deck that would give the 
crew tactical options in the event that of a breach of the second hull. Similar to the design 
used in the Titanic, these compartments could be used to control flooding and listing.  
The bulkheads also provided a method to isolate damage and possibly make temporary 
repairs while at sea.  
In addition to the double-hull construction and eleven bulkheads, there were two 
longitudinal bulkheads; one on each side of the vessel and extending nearly half the 
length of the ship. These watertight spaces served as the massive coal bunkers necessary 
for high-speed transatlantic travel when Lusitania’s appetite for fuel reached one 
thousand tons of coal each day. When full (as they were at the beginning of a voyage), 
they also provided protection for the boilers and engines from gunfire that penetrated the 
outer hull plating. Unfortunately, they provided no protection in the event of a torpedo 
attack.  As Lusitania neared the end of its voyage from New York to Liverpool, these 
cavernous bunkers were essentially empty. As a result, a design precaution intended to 
protect the ship (including supplementing its speed with transatlantic range), instead 
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promptly flooded and actually contributed to the dramatic list that inhibited lifeboat 
deployment and contributed also to the ships rapid submersion. Thus a design 
consideration that never anticipated a below-water torpedo strike, contributed to the 
accelerated time to sinking of Lusitania and its elevated loss of life. 
Captain Turner testified under oath that he had ordered all sixty-one bulkhead 
doors closed as a precaution on the morning of the disaster.  Later, during the Mersey 
Inquiry, Turner acknowledged that he never received confirmation that his order had 
been executed, but believed it to be the case.  This precaution appears to have been moot.  
The secondary explosion observed by the U-20 crew and Lusitania survivors which most 
likely was one of Lusitania’s four massive boilers, would have enlarged the hole created 
by the torpedo and rendered many of the compartments nonviable, regardless of the 
position of the bulkhead doors. 
Another precaution coming out of the Titanic disaster was the requirement that all 
British passenger ships carry a Staff Captain on board.  The Staff Captain was in charge 
of ships internal administration and could be called upon to assume Captain’s duties in 
the event that the captain is incapacitated, missing, or lost at sea.  While Lusitania left 
New York with Captain Turner and Staff Captain Anderson on board, only Captain 
Turner survived.  Turner was in command of his ship until he was swept overboard as the 
ship submerged.  Anderson’s body was never recovered. 
A pre-voyage precaution that was not taken was the (post-construction) 
installation of  4.7 inch guns as was the recommendation of the British Admiralty in a 
program begun months prior to Lusitania’s departure from New York.  Given Lusitania’s 
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speed and enhanced design, her vulnerability may have been judged as less than that of 
other ships outfitted as a priority in early phases of the program.  Importantly, the 
Lusitania was not in full use by the British Admiralty when she sailed for Liverpool in 
May of 1915.  She would only have been permitted to carry guns if she was a warship 
under Admiralty command.  Importantly, had the Lusitania carried guns, she would have 
forfeited her rights as a civilian vessel to not be attacked without warning. 
 
Post-Launch Precautions: 
Patrols, escorts, & Decoded Enemy Intercepts 
On the morning of April 25, 1915, six days before the Lusitania left New York, 
the German High Seas Fleet Command ordered three of its North Sea U-boats out on an 
intercept and attack mission in southern British waters. German Commander Hermann 
Bauer of the 3
rd
 Submarine Flotilla ordered U-30 to the Dartmouth area, U-20 and U-27 
to the Irish Sea and Bristol Channel.
28
 According to Commander Bauer’s diary, the U-
boat orders were explicit: attack enemy troopships steaming out of major British ports in 
the English and Irish Channels such as Liverpool and Dover.  
British intelligence (Room 40) intercepted and decoded the orders.  In addition, 
U-20 tested her radio on April 30 and this too was intercepted. At that point, the 
Admiralty knew with a good deal of certainty which boats were patrolling, where they 
were dispatched to, and the tactical reputations of their respective commanders. The 
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intercepted information was interpreted and forwarded to the Grand Fleet and the major 
south coastal stations by May 4. 
Although the Grand Fleet was aware of a clear and present danger to the 
Lusitania, it did not provide an escort to the passenger liner or any other non-military 
vessel in the area.  Both the Centurion and the Candidate were unescorted through the 
waters south of the Coningbeg Lightship on May 6
th
; both were sunk by the U-20.  As the 
Lusitania approached the southern coast of Ireland and the German-declared warzone, it 
did so in dense fog. The weather played an integral part in putting the Lusitania and the 
U-20 on a deadly course toward one another.  
Because of the limitations of navigational technology, thick coastal fog was cause 
for caution in maritime operations of the time.  The liner, Empress of Ireland was sunk in 
May of 1914 after a collision with a Norwegian ship confounded by a thick fog on the St. 
Lawrence River in North America.  Over one thousand people lost their lives in the 
disaster. On the approach to Ireland’s southern coast, Lusitania’s officers had decidedly 
slowed the ship and ultimately altered its course.  They did so to be within visual contact 
of certain coastal navigation markers once the fog cleared.  
Once free of the fog, Captain Turner slowed the ship further and straightened its 
course so that the bridge could recalibrate its navigation system and make final 
adjustments to steam towards its destination of Liverpool.  This was a precaution taken 
on Turner’s orders and due entirely to his calculation that the risk of skewed navigational 
coordinates outweighed the risk of attack.  This miscalculation may have been unduly 
influenced by the disaster involving the Empress of Ireland just one year earlier. 
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Regardless of its motivation, it proved to be a post-launch precaution taken on account of 
one risk, that catastrophically put Lusitania in harms way for another. The maneuvers 
Turner undertook put the liner on a slow, straight course in an area German submarines 
were known to frequent (The Headlands) and that the Admiralty had given clear 
instructions for all ships to avoid. 
The major coastal naval stations including Queenstown, Liverpool, and Milford 
Haven  were informed of the German patrols days after the Grand Fleet Command and 
were not well prepared to provide Lusitania the precautions justified by the situation. Nor 
were they equipped to counter the threat.  That being said, the British certainly could have 
assigned more ships to patrol along Lusitania's track without directly escorting the 
liner.
29
  However, in order for other ships to be assigned to the Queenstown area, they 
had to be taken from other operating areas in the war, such as the entrance to the Baltic 
Sea. At that time, the Royal Navy wanted their best ships concentrated in high risk areas, 
of which there were many.  Queenstown was not strategic, nor was it considered to be an 
area that was particularly vulnerable to German control.   
The Royal Navy Commander at Queenstown, Rear Admiral Sir Charles Coke had 
only a rag-tag fleet of small craft and armed trawlers with which to patrol a large expanse 
of the contested Irish Sea.  The Queenstown patrol was known fondly as the “Gilbert & 
Sullivan Navy” and had not a single boat capable of keeping pace with the Lusitania.30  
Nor were any equipped with depth charges as the weapon was not fully deployed until 
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1917.  With fifteen small, slow sea craft patrolling one hundred and eighty miles of 
coastline, Admiral Coke understood the grave insufficiency Queenstown posed to 
Lusitania. 
The only substantial warship available to Coke at Queenstown was the HMS 
Juno.  The cruiser was nearly obsolete (commissioned in 1897) and vulnerable to 
submarine attack herself.   Nonetheless, as the most powerful operating ship available, 
the Juno was reported to have been patrolling the area of the U-20 near the time of 
attack.
31
 In his war diary, Captain Schwieger noted that approximately 90 minutes prior 
to firing on the Lusitania, the U-20 heard the Juno passing by on the surface.
32
 Twenty-
five minutes later during an attempt to attack the Juno, Schweiger spotted her zigzagging 
under full speed heading to Queenstown (to complete its patrol).
33
 British war records 
confirm Juno’s noontime position as approximately that of the U-20’s.  Unknown to the 
command of the Juno at that time, Schwieger gave underwater chase.  Although the Juno 
was much slower than the Lusitania, her speed and zigzag course out-maneuvered the U-
20 and she returned safely to port.
34
 
However insufficient, the Queenstown patrols were a post-launch precaution the 
Royal Navy provided at this point in the war.  German submarine commanders loathed 
the armed trawlers since it was necessary for a submarine to surface in order to launch at 
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torpedo. While on the surface, a submarine was slower and far less maneuverable than a 
trawler.  In addition, trawlers were not considered a high-value target by either navy. 
German submarines carried no more than six torpedoes and these were intended for more 
consequential targets. The irony of that day is that had Juno drawn the attack from the U-
20, Schwieger would have used his last available torpedo on a far lower-value target than 
the Lusitania. The U-20 had fired three one day earlier with two striking their targets.  U-
boat captains were required to maintain at least two torpedoes for protection on the return 
trip to homeport for refueling and rearming. Therefore the torpedo that devastated the 
Lusitania, could quite possibly have not been available to Schwieger, had it been 
expended on the Juno patrolling the channel only an hour earlier.  
Equally ironic, patrols intended to protect the Lusitania that day inadvertently 
contributed to her destruction.  The U-20 gave chase to the unsuspecting Juno for a 
period of time as she steamed toward Queenstown.  In fact, this (unsuccessful) chase put 
the U-20 on an intercept course with the Lusitania.  At 12:45pm and shortly after giving 
up the on the Juno, Schwieger surfaced to find “unusually good visibility, very beautiful 
weather.”35 After 30 minutes on the surface, Schwieger detected at a distance of thirteen 
miles, “four funnels and two masts of a large passenger steamer”36 The U-20 submerged 
immediately and proceeded at full speed (about 9 knots underwater) toward its prey and 
on a straight course towards Queenstown.  Schwieger did not believe he would be in a 
position to attack the passenger liner if it stayed on its course.  Incredibly, the Lusitania 
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suddenly changed course and began a heading away from Queenstown toward the U-20’s 
position.
37
  Unknown to Schwieger, Captain Turner decided to use the break in the 
weather conditions to recalibrate Lusitania’s navigation ordinates prior to steaming into 
the last leg of its voyage to Liverpool. It was an entirely ordinary, but fateful decision for 
Captain Turner. 
 
A Declared Target Without Escort 
While it is clear that Lusitania was a declared target and steaming into an area of 
known enemy submarine activity, the Admiralty’s rationale not to provide escort or 
increased patrols is not so clear.  Some historians believe Juno was initially assigned to 
escort the Lusitania, but was reassigned two days before the attack. According to author 
Colin Simpson, after noon on May the 5
th
 , the Admiralty ordered the Juno to abandon its 
escort mission and to return to port.
38
 The Admiralty War Diary indicates that it 
suggested that destroyers from Milford Haven take up the escort of the Lusitania 
although the Haven was farther away from the liner’s location than Queenstown and its 
turn-of-the-century cruiser.  Regardless of the Admiralty’s suggestion, the Milford Haven 
destroyers were never ordered to sea.  Nor is there any record that the Lusitania was 
notified of the provision of escort or its ordered retreat.  Captain Turner testified at the 
coroner’s inquest immediately following the sinking that he knew of no plans for an 
escort of the Lusitania at any point in her voyage.  Contrary to Simpson’s report, it seems 
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unlikely that the Juno was ever seriously considered as an effective escort for the 
Lusitania. 
The Lusitania’s lack of escort should be considered a major tactical error and one 
with significant consequences. Perhaps more than any other precaution taken, escorts 
were effective deterrents against a single U-boat attack, as Allied experience early in the 
war shows. 
Exhibit III 
 
Because of their effectiveness, demand for escorts was understandably high. 
Britain’s naval war strategy of blockading German sources of food and other resources 
had the effect of spreading the Allies’ normally abundant naval assets very thin. 
Compounding matters was the state of the ground war and its voracious appetite for fresh 
troops.  Troop ships from Canada and elsewhere therefore, were given priority over other 
shipping.  Finally, the British had deployed a new class of battleship prior to the war 
called the Dreadnought. These enormous ships required significant complimentary assets 
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to be effectively deployed in a sea battle.  This meant that much of the British destroyer 
fleet was otherwise committed to protecting the Navy’s newest and by far, most-
expensive strategic weapon.  Its destroyer fleet was at the same time effecting Britain’s 
blockade of Germany and escorting troop ships servicing the ground war. The 
Admiralty’s decision-making apparatus was no doubt operating under the conditions of a 
severely overextended destroyer force.  It can be speculated that this may have influenced 
the decision not to supply Lusitania with escort(s) from Milford Haven. It is also likely 
that the fact that the destroyers were some five hours away from Lusitania on May 7
th
 
diminished the considerations of ordering a Milford Haven escort to sea.  
By the Spring of 1915, even escorts of the highest priority (troop convoys) were 
being cancelled due to the lack of destroyers.  On March 29
th
 for example, the Admiralty 
informed Canadian authorities all escorts of Canadian troop ships would cease after May 
7th.
39
  Some military historians have suggested in retrospect, that perhaps the Admiralty 
should have recognized the grave threat posed to the Lusitania and if unable to provide 
destroyer escort, certainly could have increased patrol along Lusitania’s known course. 
However, its seems logical that the overextension of naval resources conceivably 
cascaded across the entire Northern Atlantic theater and no doubt implicated patrol 
coverage as well.  The terrible irony is that the Juno was returning to port from routine 
patrol when it unknowingly crossed paths with the U-20 less than two hours before the 
submarine closed on the Lusitania for the kill.  Clearly, patrols were not as effective as 
escorts for mitigating the threat of attack.  
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Nonetheless, Cunard itself could have applied for escort at any point of 
Lusitania’s voyage.  Cunard officials were aware of the rising threat levels and in fact 
convened an urgent meeting with Rear Admiral Stileman in Liverpool on the morning of 
the attack. In fact, the Cunard Company itself later acknowledged that it had made no 
application for an escort ship.
40
 The ship itself could have made the application for escort 
through Captain Turner.  He did not.  The following exchange is from the Coroner’s 
Inquiry: 
Juror:  In the face of the warnings you had had, that the vessel would 
be torpedoed before she reached her destination, did you make any 
application to the Admiralty for escort? 
Turner:  No, we left that to them. 
Juror: Are you aware whether your owners made any application? 
Turner:  I know nothing whatsoever about it.  I simply received my 
orders to go and I went.   And I would do so again. 
Juror:  Do you think it would have been advisable for patrol boats to 
have accompanied you? 
Turner:  It might have helped, but it might not have done so. 
Coroner:  I suppose it might not have prevented it [the torpedoing] in 
the slightest degree? 
Turner:  No. They might have torpedoed them [the escorts] as well. 
 
Turner’s testimony indicates that he was under no order or advisement to 
rendezvous with the Juno or any other ship.  He also seems to cover for the Admiralty as 
well as his employer, Cunard without implicating himself.   It is difficult, however to 
reconcile Turner’s indifference to patrols with the German U-boat commander’s concern 
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about them.  If the Admiralty believed that patrols were such ineffective deterrents, why 
have them at all – particularly under such depleted fleet conditions?  Turner was not 
asked if he thought a patrol accompaniment would have affected the significant loss of 
life suffered by the Lusitania.  It is conceivable that Turner would have thought an 
accompaniment advisable not necessarily to deter the attack, but in the recovery from its 
consequences. 
An additional precaution available to the Admiralty and to Captain Turner was to 
divert the passenger liner to Juno’s homeport in nearby Queenstown until the threat of 
submarine attack receded. Such an order however, would have conflicted with wartime 
policy to avoid the harbors and to steam past the Headlands. It is important to keep in 
mind that during wartime, all British ships were placed under the control of the 
Admiralty.  Like Juno, Lusitania’s movements were first at the discretion of the 
Admiralty and second by way of its owner through its captain.  While patrols may or may 
not have deterred the attack, the proximity of the patrol craft to Lusitania’s position after 
being torpedoed would most definitely aided in recovery.  Likewise, if the liner had been 
ordered to Queenstown, it would have been taken from harm’s way. There is little 
question that had either of these precautions been undertaken, they would have mitigated 
the loss of life, if not avoided the Lusitania disaster entirely. 
Part of the Admiralty’s consideration was likely that an escort provision itself was 
not without consequence.  By coming under armed escort, Lusitania would sacrifice her 
protected status as a merchantman under international maritime law.  A U-boat captain 
would then have (at best) a moral obligation - but no legal requirement - to warn the ship 
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before attacking.  Ironically, an escort would therefore raise, not lower, a submarine’s 
incentive to attack by marking a ship already difficult to identify from a distance, as a 
war asset worthy of protection (under severely limited escort provisions that the Germans 
were well aware of).  By providing escort, the Admiralty may have inadvertently signaled 
(incorrectly) that Lusitania carried troops or other valuable wartime assets.  The 
Admiralty’s suggestion to deploy Milford Haven destroyers never materialized into an 
order to do so.  This precaution considered - but ultimately ignored - may have been 
influenced by considerations such as a change in Lusitania’s status that would silence a 
pre-attack warning normally afforded civilian vessels. Thus the Admiralty’s calculus may 
have assumed (wrongly) that the unescorted passenger liner would have been allowed 
time to abandon ship before being torpedoed.   
The fact pattern prior to the attack on the Lusitania supported such an assumption 
by the Admiralty.  The warning in the New York papers aside, German U-boats had 
rarely attacked passenger liners, neutral or otherwise until May 7
th
. Merchant vessels 
attacked before that date were allowed to have crew and passengers seek the safety of 
lifeboats in accordance of international law.  As the British blockade wore on however, 
German U-boats were beginning to turn to open-seas warfare, without regard to the 
international conventions or norms. 
However, the Admiralty’s decision not to order a destroyer escort may have 
rested on other priorities.  The four destroyers in Milford Haven – Legion, Lucifer,  
Linnet, and Laverock – had recently finished an eight-day operation successfully 
escorting Irish troops and equipment to Liverpool (Lusitania’s destination) for shipment 
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to the strategic Dardanelles campaign on the continent. All four destroyers put into 
Milford on May 6
th 
with orders to perform maintenance, repairs, to resupply, and to 
immediately rendezvous with the dreadnought Colossus at midday on May 8
th
. The fact 
that the Admiralty declined the option to delay the movement of the Colossus and 
temporarily redeploy its Milford Haven destroyer group to escort Lusitania suggests the 
dreadnought was deemed the higher priority. 
After May 7
th, the Admiralty’s calculus changed slightly.  Two weeks after the 
sinking of the Lusitania the Royal Navy was ordered to send destroyers from Harwich to 
Liverpool (approx. 600 miles) to provide escort for Lusitania’s sister liner Mauretania, 
taking troops to the Mediterranean theater.
41
 
The implications of the intercepted messages from the German command to the 
three U-boats became apparent on May 5, 1915.  On that date, the British Admiralty’s 
high command met including First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, First Sea 
Lord Adm Jack Fisher, Chief of War Staff Vice Admiral Henry Oliver, and Director of 
Naval Intelligence Capt Reginald Hall.
42
 Also on that date, the sinking of the schooner 
Earl of Lathom by torpedo and shell fire indicated that at least one of the three U-boats 
was active off the south coast of Ireland. 
At noon the next day, the Admiralty addressed all British ships: 
Between South Foreland and Folkstone keep within 
two miles of shore and pass between the two light 
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vessels.  Take Liverpool pilot at bar.  Avoid 
headlands; pass harbors at full speed; steer mid-
channel course.  Submarines off Fastnet. 
British Admiralty High Command 
May 6, 1915 
Lusitania received the message at 8:05 pm and acknowledged receipt. Fifteen 
minutes prior, it had also received a message from the nearby Queenstown naval base 
that simply read: “Submarines off of south coast (of Ireland).” Lusitania acknowledged 
receipt of the Queenstown message as well.   Earlier in the day, the U-20 sank two ships 
off Coiningbeg Light: the Candidate at 7:40am and Centurion at 2:30pm.  However, 
Lusitania was not made aware of the loss of these ships until late morning on the next 
day. 
At this point, the Admiralty was running out of options as the noose tightened 
around Lusitania’s neck.  On the morning of May 7th – Lusitania’s last day afloat – 
Alfred Booth, Chairman of Cunard Lines requested and secured an emergency meeting 
with the Senior Naval Officer at Liverpool (Rear Admiral Stileman).  Booth was aware of 
the May 5
th
 and 6
th
 attacks along Lusitania’s route and was now frantic with concern for 
his liner and its passengers. By established wartime protocol, all communication with any 
ship’s bridge was under the exclusive authority of the British Admiralty while the ship 
was in war zone waters.  Unauthorized to make direct contact with his own ship, Booth 
asked that Captain Turner be contacted immediately and be made aware of the danger 
posed by the U-20 including that two ships the Candidate and the Centurion had been 
sunk the previous day in the general vicinity of where the Lusitania was sailing.
43
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Whatever precautions Booth and Stileman discussed or agreed to, none were put into 
effect.  The U-20 intercepted its target shortly after Booth’s desperate meeting concluded 
and inflicted a single, mortal wound that sank Lusitania in 18 minutes.  There is no 
record of Cunard’s Chairman requesting the Admiralty’s assistance other than on the day 
she was sunk.
44
  
 
 
Precautions Undertaken by the Captain and Crew 
By May 5
th
 and perhaps earlier, the captain and crew of the Lusitania appear to 
have been aware of the threat of submarine attack. Although they did not discuss the 
threat in the company of passengers unless addressing a passenger’s question, they 
nonetheless took many (but not all) precautions they had available to them.  The 
motivation for the actions taken were most likely the well-established protocols for all 
passenger ships entering the German submarine warzone declared around England and 
Ireland, or specific orders issued by the Admiralty.  Actions taken by Captain Turner 
outside of normal protocol or specific orders did not appear to be evasive or reactionary 
in nature. The hand Turner had been dealt by the Admiralty, by Cunard, and by the 
German High Seas Command was extraordinary.  Turner would prove to be a less than 
ordinary captain.  The combination was disastrous. 
  The Lusitania had a strategic asset that when properly deployed, tilted the odds 
in a submarine attack measurably in her favor: she was fast and German submarines of 
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the time were relatively slow. Lusitania had a top speed of 24 knots displaced across 4 
engines fired by 25 boilers. German U-boats mustered 15 knots under full speed on the 
surface under normal sea conditions.  Under calm seas - such as those in the Channel the 
day of the attack – the U-20 on patrol was capable of up to 16-18 knots. Under conditions 
of attack or retreat however, the U-20 would submerge and labor under a top speed of 9 
knots.  
In addition to Lusitania’s cruising speed, the liner was also advantaged in her 
ability to accelerate.  That ability however, was not as easily deployed under attack 
conditions. Rather, it relied on the ability of the crew to spot a pending strike and issue an 
alert immediately to the bridge.  By orders of the Admiralty, a ship was to turn 
immediately into the path of attack and accelerate toward the submarine while presenting 
a much narrower profile to the on-coming torpedoes and the periscope-dependent 
targeting mechanism. 
On May 7
th
, additional spotters (quartermasters) had been ordered as a precaution 
by Captain Turner to stand watch on either side of the bridge.
45
 This was normal protocol 
given that submarines were known to be in the vicinity and on the hunt. In addition, 
Turner instructed the engine room to be prepared “to give full speed . . . give the highest 
steam they could get”.46 47 However, Captain Turner neutralized Lusitania’s advantages 
by charting a course that was straight, steady and slow instead of zig-zagging and 
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ordering full steam, as were the standing orders from the Admiralty.  Critically, the 
Captain did not order the idle boilers in Engine Room 4 to be fired up.
48
 Turner would 
later testify to several somewhat conflicting reasons for neglecting to follow Admiralty’s 
orders as was required by all ships entering the war zone. One of Captain Turner’s 
reasons was to time the ship’s approach to the Mersey River bar (to avoid to wait for a 
pilot and expose the Lusitania.) Another reason was that Turner’s interpretation of the 
orders was different than that of the Admiralty with regards to the zig-zagging and mid-
channel course instructions. 
At 8am on the morning of May 7, 1915, Captain Turner reduced Lusitania’s 
speed from 21 to 18 knots.
49
 Fog had enveloped the ship and apparently was calculated as 
a greater risk to the ship’s safety than a submarine attack.  A half hour later, Turner 
ordered a further reduction in speed to 15 knots.
50
 At that speed, the Captain had 
surrendered – at least temporarily – the Lusitania’s critical strategic advantage.  Along 
with further slowing the ship, Turner also ordered the ship’s foghorns to be sounded 
every minute.
51
 The concurrent timing of these two orders seems to support Turner’s 
testimony that weather conditions dictated a course of action that conflicted with 
Admiralty orders.  The passenger response to the frequent foghorn blasts was surprise.  
Some worried that it would attract attention and give enemy submarines another means of 
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locating the unescorted ship.  Others interpreted it as a reassuring sign of the Captain’s 
confidence on the final, short leg of the voyage. 
Captain Turner and the Lusitania’s crew took additional precautions consistent 
with knowledge of the submarine threat. All portholes and watertight doors were ordered 
closed (it was later acknowledged that execution of this order was incomplete).  The only 
exception to this order was the Boiler Room bulkheads.
52
 This exception was not 
common and was due in large part to the Captain’s decision to leave certain boilers idle. 
This would require that the crew have immediate and unimpeded access across all four 
boiler rooms should the order come down to engage full power.  As benign and 
unexceptional as this decision seems to be, its consequences would later prove lethal.   
Turner also ordered that the lookouts be replaced every 2 hours. He then doubled 
their number at dawn. Although Staff Captain Anderson reported to Turner that all ports 
and bulkheads were closed on the Main and Lower decks, the Captain did not order a 
spot inspection.
53
 
54
 Regardless of the trust between a captain and staff captain, naval 
operations experts believed a spot inspection under the circumstances presenting on the 
morning of May 7
th
, would not have been unusual. 
Finally, Turner ordered the lifeboats be swung out.  This precaution was standard 
in the event that an abandon ship order was necessary. This would allow for the rapid 
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loading and deployment of Lusitania’s considerable lifeboat capacity.  This was a critical 
precaution that the captain and crew did take. 
Unfortunately, Turner and his officers largely ignored precautions normally 
ordered with regards to steerage, course and speed. The sum of these decisions steered 
the Lusitania into the Headlands where submarines had advantages and were known to 
hunt.  Critically, the zigzag course that had saved the Juno and was considered standard 
procedure was abandoned in an effort by Turner to time his approach to Liverpool and 
avoid holding outside the harbor waiting for tides to advance.  The standing order from 
the Admiralty for full-speed conflicted with Cunard’s commercial interest in preserving 
fuel. A slower, straight course reduced the considerable consumption of coal that 
Lusitania was famous for (over the recommended full-speed zigzag) and thus apparently 
prevailed.  
The bridge lost the ship’s position in the fog and this also influenced speed and 
course.  After the weather cleared, Turner made the fateful decision to recalibrate the 
ship’s navigation ordinates using visible land markers.  This required that the ship 
proceed near shore (instead of mid-channel), at a constant (slow) speed, and on a straight 
course relative to land. After fixing Lusitania’s position, Turner made a deliberate and 
dramatic course correction of more than thirty degrees.
55
 
56
  As it turned out, it was this 
correction that inadvertently put Lusitania within reach of the U-20 - which had already 
sighted the liner and was in chase. Failure to follow the steerage, course, and speed 
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precautions was widely criticized and deeply probed in the various post-disaster inquiries 
that were held regarding Lusitania.  
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CHAPTER IV   
THE ADMIRALTY’S ORDERS 
 
 
The threat to Allied shipping by the German submarine force was in direct 
response to (and perhaps mirrored) the threat to Germany posed by Britain’s own 
protracted starvation blockade when she mined the North Sea and ruthlessly intercepted 
supplies bound for Germany. Although almost every European belligerent possessed 
submarines of their own, it was Germany alone who recognized the submarine’s 
considerable strategic value and accordingly allocated resources to its prolific 
development. The British, in contrast, saw the battleship as the premier weapon system 
and since the turn of the century rebuilt its Navy around the powerful Dreadnought class 
battleship. 
The submarine was a relatively new naval asset when the war began.  It could be 
deployed quickly and inexpensively with relative stealth.  While they were vulnerable on 
the surface and carried limited capacity to attack or defend, anti-submarine warfare was 
in its infancy at the outbreak of the war and submarines were much more quickly and 
inexpensively replaced than most other warships. Britain’s primary vulnerability in war 
was its extended supply lines.  It built massive redundancy in its civilian fleet to insure 
that it could receive the resources necessary to conduct war without interruption.  The 
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Germans believed the submarine to be a superior weapons system to disrupt Allied 
supplies.  Furthermore, the rules for engagement involving submarines were often 
unclear, underdeveloped, or in some cases non-existent, conveying greater flexibility 
(and at times greater autonomy and stricter accountability) to the German fleet. 
The submarine gave Germany a superior weapon against its enemy’s chief 
vulnerability.  Germany also possessed the added advantage of defining for itself how 
that weapon could be used.  As England’s blockade tightened, Germany intended to 
extend its submarine fleet towards civilian shipping and passenger transport craft 
belonging to its adversaries. Facing the challenge of defending itself against an enemy it 
often could not see or hear, the British (who possessed the largest civilian fleet in the 
world) developed strategies which the captain of a British-owned or operated ship must 
follow when approaching the British Isles from the North Sea. These strategies were 
operationalized in the form of General Admiralty Orders: 
1. To avoid headlands, where U-boats typically hunted 
2. To steer a mid-channel course 
3. To operate at full speed off harbors 
4. To preserve wireless silence within 100 miles of land, save for an emergency 
5. To post extra lookouts 
6. To maintain lifeboats ready for lowering and provisioned 
7. To keep on the move outside ports and harbors 
8. To steer a zigzag course 
57
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Although these orders - created under the authority of the British Admiralty - 
were meant to lower the chances of a ship being attacked or sunk by a U-boat, they did 
not promise immunity. Nor did they relieve the executive officers aboard a ship of their 
authority or accountabilities. In addition to the standing orders, which were modified 
frequently as submarine conduct became better understood, the Admiralty issued ship-
specific instructions and allocated scarce resources such as escorts, as circumstances 
dictated.  History shows that these strategies and orders were simply not enough.  
Germany could make submarines faster than Britain could counter their effects. Monthly 
Allied losses to submarine attacks rose to a peak of nearly 900,000 tons (see Exhibit III) 
before America entered the war.  
 
New Technology Challenges Accepted Rules of War 
The only guarantee of the ship’s safety lay in its national registration under a 
neutral power not yet at war with either of the belligerent powers. Early in the war, 
neutrally-operated ships such as the United States passenger liner New York were allowed 
to safely enter the designated submarine war zone surrounding the British Isles. Such 
ships were required to display internationally accepted forms of identification along their 
hull and within the superstructure. However, even strict adherence was not failsafe.   
Identifying a ship in rough water through a periscope was fraught with error. In 
addition to the “fog of war,” identification such as this was open to abuse. The accepted 
rules of warfare for the time would concede that a ship belonging to a belligerent power 
that used a neutral flag and identification markings to protect itself and crew from attack, 
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would be considered outside the accepted rules of war.  Obviously, such a law of the sea 
proved too difficult to effectively enforce.  In the case of submarines in particular, new 
rules of engagement were frequently being formed and reformed. Public opinion often 
lagged the reality that submarine technology presented, as both sides struggled with 
establishing the moral norms for the deployment of a new and deadly weapon system. 
Numerous other protocols of the time were not infrequently observed or 
disregarded entirely.  A submarine was to warn its prey of imminent attack and allow 
time for the passengers and crew to abandon ship. Early in the war, the expectation was 
that a crew from the submarine was to go aboard the ship and inspect its manifest to 
search for contraband cargo that would justify sinking the ship. Early conventions also 
prohibited attacking survivors in lifeboats or those in the water.  Because of Germany’s 
elevated use of the submarine, they would eventually dismiss these and other rules of 
engagement by declaring unrestricted submarine warfare. This coincided with a dramatic 
increase in Allied losses beginning in the Spring of 1915 (see Exhibit III).  Germany 
unilaterally abandoned these practices because of the danger they imposed on the 
submarine and its crew - particularly while the submarine was on the surface. Submarines 
were most vulnerable to attack on the surface by ships that rammed or were armed with 
guns.  In addition, the considerable time it took to abandon and search a ship was 
frequently time enough for nearby ships to respond to distress calls and descend on the 
area and a vulnerable target.  
This scenario was best illustrated in February of 1915.  The submarine war zone 
was first announced internationally and the Lusitania was steaming towards Liverpool in 
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what would be its last full round trip of the Atlantic route. When the ship entered the war 
zone, Captain Daniel Dow became concerned due to the possibility of the ship being 
torpedoed. Unknown to Captain Dow, the German government had assigned a two week 
period in which ships and their commercial interests could familiarize and prepare 
themselves for the submarine blockade before it became active. Not knowing this 
information, Captain Dow had a full-sized American flag erected at the stern and also had 
a small American flag and mail pennant flown from the ship’s forepeak. Captain Dow 
later explained the reason for erecting the American flags at various points on the ship 
was not to try to hide its identity from German submariners (rather unlikely to mislead 
given Lusitania’s distinct features), but rather to inform any submarines in the vicinity 
that the Lusitania was carrying American passengers.
58
 The Lusitania steamed at full 
speed (21 - 25 knots) straight to the safety of Liverpool without an attack coming against 
the ship.  
 The British government defended Captain Dow’s decision to fly the American 
flag, and passengers and crew applauded it.
59
 The German government protested the 
event and the American government sent a weak protest itself to the British.  Not 
unexpectedly, the British response to the Americans was an equally weak reply. The 
Lusitania would not be the last and only ship to try to hide behind a neutral flag.  The 
German Empire continued its diplomatic protests in earnest over such abuses, but no 
power heeded them. In fact, Britain allowed its captains to continue this practice to save 
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their ships, crew and cargoes from destruction. In response to the continued disheveling 
of the accepted rules of warfare, the use of neutral flags on belligerent ships would be a 
prime factor in Germany’s decision to declare unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917. 
 
Entering The Warzone 
On May 6
th
 - one day prior to its sinking - the Lusitania had entered the German 
submarine warzone. As detailed in the special instructions provided by the Admiralty to 
British merchant ship captains, the main lifeboats were swung out over the water, 
prepared for lowering and properly provisioned.
60
 The collapsible lifeboats however, 
were left fastened and held to the deck per the orders of Captain Turner who did not want 
to have the boats sliding around or off the ship in the event of rough seas.
61
 Most of the 
bulkhead doors throughout the ship had been lowered that morning and stationed 
lookouts were doubled on each side of the ship and at the crow’s nest. Two officers along 
with quartermasters were assigned on each side of the bridge at all times.
62
 The 
Lusitania’s name on the bow and registration numbers were painted over at the beginning 
of the war. Her identification and nationality flags were taken down upon entering the 
warzone.
63
 At the beginning of the war, Lusitania’s hull and part of her superstructure 
was painted black to camouflage the ship at night. As an additional precaution, she was 
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not permitted to turn on any electric light during the night hours. Crew and passengers 
had to navigate the ship by oil lantern only. 
In addition to these precautions, the Lusitania received a coded, wireless telegram 
from the British Admiralty through the Valencia Wireless station on the morning of May 
6
th
.  The message was clear: submarines were active off of the south coast of Ireland and 
off of Fastnet Rock which was not far from the Old Head of Kinsale.
64
 According to the 
testimony of Captain William Turner, at 2:15PM the ship was 15 miles off of the Old 
Head of Kinsale. The Head was a rocky outcropping with a lighthouse which juts out into 
the English Channel from the Irish mainland close to the town of Kinsale
65
 
The Admiralty’s instructions were unambiguous in regard to the nature and 
location of the threat that afternoon. “German submarines appear to be operating chiefly 
off prominent headlands and landfalls. Ships should give prominent headlands a wide 
berth”66 Merchant ships were to avoid headlands by giving them a wide space and were 
to keep a mid-channel course in order to compromise a German submarine’s use of 
prominent landmarks and headlands as navigation points. In fact, both submarines and 
merchant ships depended on landmarks such as Fastnet Rock and the Old Head of 
Kinsale for daytime navigation.  However, under these compromised conditions, surface 
ships had advantages over submarines. Submarines were required to surface to fix 
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coordinates while merchant ships could constantly process any alternative navigation 
signals, be they intermittent or random.  
On balance, a mid-channel course slightly advantaged the Lusitania.  However, 
were the ship to be attacked, the course ordered by the Admiralty might make rescue and 
recovery operations more difficult. Rescuers would be burdened by an uncertain location 
of a daytime attack and by greater distances from the wreck site to shore.  A mid-channel 
position would also limit the options available to the captain and crew to reach port or to 
save the ship by grounding her.  
Besides the course of his ship, Captain Turner had been instructed to also keep 
away from Headlands, to travel at full speed and to adopt a zigzagging cruise pattern 
while in the declared warzone. The speed & zig-zag pattern worked well in tandem and 
were universally considered a superior kill-zone maneuver.  Executed in concert, these 
actions had the effect of reducing the target’s footprint in a periscope, made an 
assessment of speed & identity less certain, and placed a merchant ship in an offensive 
position that might force the submarine to submerge prematurely. While these 
instructions were sent and received with the warning of submarine activity, they were 
also acknowledged. However, none were followed by the Lusitania.  
 Weather conditions, Cunard commercial interests, and the captain’s desire to 
secure navigational certainty all played a role in the failure to execute the Admiralty’s 
instructions. The Lusitania encountered dense, encroaching fog on the morning of May 
7
th
.  In light of the deteriorating conditions, Captain Turner ordered that the speed of the 
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ship be reduced from 18 knots to 15 knots.
67
 The speed was increased back to 18 knots 
when the fog cleared. The Lusitania’s maximum speed was widely acknowledged as 24 
knots. However commercial interests prevailed.   
The war had negatively impacted the passenger liner business in Europe. Demand 
was down compared to the pre-war years, as fewer Europeans had the means or interest 
to travel by sea outside the continent. Fuel consumption was one of the largest expenses 
in operating a passenger liner and while Lusitania was fast, it also consumed immense 
amounts of coal. The war had increased military demand for coal and its price therefore 
rose dramatically. Cunard had decided to conserve fuel and instructed Turner to shut 
down six of the ships twenty-five operating boilers, leaving only 19 operational.
68
 This 
singularly economic measure reduced the maximum speed of the ship from 24 to 21 
knots.  
In addition to Admiralty orders and Cunard operating directives, Captain Turner 
was also considering natural constraints such as trade winds and tides when he 
considered Lusitania’s speed and course. Captain Turner’s original voyage plan had 
already been altered by a delayed launch out of New York – at the request of the 
Admiralty.  The plan had been designed to meet the Admiralty’s expectations that the 
Lusitania reach her scheduled port of Liverpool the following morning. The Admiralty 
instructions dated February 10, 1915 stated that “So far as consistent with the particular 
trades and states of tides, vessels should sail at dusk and make their ports at dawn.” 
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Captain Turner had received a copy of these instructions before the voyage.
69
 Preceding 
the attack, the Lusitania was about 240 miles away from the sandbar that juts out from 
the Mersey River and on which Liverpool sits.
70
 A steering pilot was to be picked up off 
the bar to guide the ship on a safe course through deep water over the bar and into the 
Mersey River. The Mersey River bar could only be crossed at high tide due to the 
shallow depth of the water and the deep displacement of Lusitania.  Stopping to pick up 
the pilot hence reduced the possibility that the ship would run aground, while adding to 
its exposure in a narrow area of the channel vulnerable to attack.  
The enemy also understood this logistical constraint.  Submarine patrols thus 
hunted the waters around the entrance to the Mersey River bar.  Captain Turner 
calculated that if he went any faster than 18 knots that the Lusitania would arrive at the 
Liverpool bar before the peak tide of 6:53AM the following day and would be effectively 
snared in a trap – figuratively a “sitting duck”.  Hence, when the Irish coast was spotted 
around 8AM on the morning of May 7
th
, the Lusitania’s speed was reduced from 21 to 18 
knots.
71
 While within sight of familiar navigational markers, the ship’s course was also 
altered to accommodate Turner to get a precise fix on his ship’s location before beginning 
the final leg of the passage. Turner intended to arrive at the Liverpool bar at the peak high 
tide when the water level was deepest in order to forgo picking up a pilot and instead just 
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steam straight into the Mersey River at a fast speed right out of the Irish Channel.
72
 
Turner was aware that this maneuver relied on precise navigation and speed. The 
consequences of being wrong on either account were potentially significant.  Arriving at 
the bar before peak high tide would have forced Captain Turner to run the Lusitania in a 
circular pattern near the mouth of the River until a high water mark presented itself again 
or a pilot could be picked up. Even though this would be in line with Admiralty 
instructions to keep on the move outside ports and harbors it would also present the 
Lusitania as a vulnerable target to enemy submarines who were known to operate off 
Liverpool. Arriving late to the mouth of the river carried the risk that the ship might run 
aground and again be indefensible against attack. 
The reduction in speed and the change in course to fix navigation prepared the 
Lusitania to ‘run the gauntlet’ as Turner had planned and as the Admiralty had instructed.  
However, these maneuvers also played into Germany’s hands. Given the location of the 
U-20 in the early morning of May 7
th
, it is unlikely that the submarine would have 
intercepted the Lusitania had she maintained speed and course. In fact, military historians 
believe that if the Lusitania had simply been traveling at its top achievable speed of 24 or 
even 21 knots – regardless of course -  she would have possibly never met the U-20 in the 
first place, due to the set of circumstances which allowed both vessels to be found in their 
exact positions right before the U-20’s torpedo was fired.73  
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Even though Turner’s failure to follow Admiralty’s instructions regarding speed 
and mid-channel course substantively explains how the Lusitania found itself in harm’s 
way, it does not entirely account for the direct hit the ship sustained. The third element of 
the Admiralty’s instruction that Turner ignored dealt with the course of the ship. The 
exact Admiralty instructions were worded as follows: 
 War experience has shown that fast steamers can 
considerably reduce the chance of a successful surprise 
submarine attack by zigzagging – that is to say, altering 
course at short and irregular interval, say, ten minutes 
to half an hour 
Captain Turner did not order the ship steered on a zigzag course. Turner later 
testified that he believed a master of a ship only needed to zigzag after a submarine was 
spotted in order to foul the torpedo’s firing solution.74  In other words, the Captain 
believed the steerage recommended by the Admiralty did not prevent surprise attack, but 
rather impeded accurate targeting of the torpedo. Captain Turner claimed these 
instructions only to be of effective use if a submarine or its periscope was actually 
spotted by the crew of a ship. This interpretation now seems remarkable for an 
experienced shipmaster like Turner. However in the Spring of 1915, Turner’s life-long 
commercial career may not have prepared him for the advanced weapons systems (such 
as the high speed torpedo and attack submarine) that could be turned on his ship.  His 
misinterpretation of Admiralty instructions can hardly be explained away by ignorance or 
naiveté. Its consequences were disastrous. 
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Early twentieth century submarines were notoriously difficult to position for a 
successful attack. Once positioned, the WWI vintage firing systems were not 
sophisticated enough to lock on a target.  Torpedo technology itself was relatively 
primitive and unreliable by modern standards and therefore random changes in direction 
by a merchant ship (zigzagging) created difficulties in positioning a U-Boat as well as in 
predicting the position of the target as it and the torpedo converged.  “The underwater 
speed of a submarine is very low, and it is exceedingly difficult for her to get into a 
position to deliver an attack unless she can observe and predict the course of the ship 
attacked.”75 
Therefore, if Captain Turner had been periodically changing the direction of his 
ship instead of the straight course parallel to the familiar coastal markings in which the 
Lusitania was actually steaming, the U-20’s targeting system may not have been as 
accurate as it was. In fact under such steerage conditions, the ship would have been at an 
advantage over a German submarine in terms of maneuverability and therefore would 
have had a greater chance of avoiding or limiting the attack. The importance of 
Lusitania’s course and steerage is highlighted in the mission log of the U-20. 
Kapitanleutnant Walther Schwieger sighted the Lusitania on a perpendicular course with 
his submarine as logged in the following observation “Ahead and to starboard four 
funnels and two masts of a steamer with course perpendicular to us come into sight 
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(coming from SSW it steered toward Galley Head). Ship is made out to be large 
passenger steamer.”76  
During the Mersey Inquiry, Captain Turner expressed doubt that he would have 
been able to make it to the Mersey bar at peak tide if he had been zigzagging.  Turner’s 
calculations and his judgment were later challenged by the testimony of Commander 
Anderson of the Royal Navy. Commander Anderson was questioned extensively during 
the Mersey Inquiry about submarine avoidance measures. Anderson acknowledged that a 
fast ship had a considerable advantage over a slower ship in escaping a submarine attack 
and that zigzagging in submarine waters was of paramount importance.  The Commander 
also calculated that if Lusitania had traveled at 21 knots instead of 18 knots, zigzagged, 
and steamed in mid-channel the Lusitania could have made it over to the Liverpool Bar 
on May 8 at high tide and would have been able to steam right through the Bar without 
picking up a pilot.
77
  This testimony openly criticized Turner’s calculations and clearly 
questioned the judgment he used to make the fateful trade-offs he did.   
The facts are that the Admiralty’s recommendations and Cunard’s operating 
accountabilities represented an irreconcilable set of instructions.  As captain, Turner was 
responsible to resolve the conflicts these instructions created.  Lusitania could not 
proceed at full speed and save fuel.  Nor could she zigzag and pass safely through the 
Mersey River bar at high tide on the planned arrival date. While the Admiralty could be 
criticized for delaying Lusitania’s departure, for not providing escort, or for denying 
                                                 
76
  Thomas Bailey and Herman Bauer and Walther Schwieger, “German Documents Relating to the 
Lusitania”, 335.  
77
 A Formal Inquiry into the Loss of the Steamship Lusitania, sess 95. 
  
62 
Juno’s deployment out of Queenstown; the warnings and instructions they provided 
Lusitania on May 6
th
 and 7th were clear and most likely would have been effective had 
they been followed.  Even these criticisms of the Admiralty should arguably be muted 
since the decisions it made were made in the larger context of the war and the allocation 
of scarce resources.  In contrast, Captain Turner’s only considerations were those of the 
safe passage of the single ship under his command. 
Thus, due to a combination of circumstances ranging from Captain Turner’s 
misjudgment and failure to follow Admiralty instructions, overhanging commercial 
interests, and navigation difficulties, the Lusitania was presented as a perfect target of 
opportunity to the U-20 on the afternoon of Friday May 7, 1915.  
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CHAPTER V 
 THE ATTACK 
 
 
The torpedo wasn’t spotted until it was only 500 yards away from impacting 
Lusitania’s hull. Of the eight crewmembers posted on watch, only Able Seaman Leslie 
Morton on the ship’s starboard bow of the Forecastle deck saw the torpedo.78 However, 
Morton was desperate to warn his brother sleeping below decks of the danger and only 
shouted a single warning into the megaphone connected to the bridge. He then abandoned 
his post without waiting for an acknowledgement.
79
 Morton acknowledged under oath 
that a full 30 seconds elapsed from him sighting the torpedo to it hitting the ship. Proper 
seamanship of the time called for continual warnings to be directed at the bridge until the 
warnings were acknowledged by the officers as having been received.
80
 
Had the officers actually heard Morton’s first and only warning, the ship would 
have had time to execute evasive maneuvers.  Maneuvers recommended by the Admiralty 
included turning the ship immediately toward the foam path of the torpedo and an 
immediate surge in forward speed. A crash course towards the submarine was the most 
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prudent action to have taken as this would have forced the attacking submarine out of 
firing position; to quickly dive to avoid getting rammed.  This course of action also 
presented Lusitania as a smaller, narrower target to any ensuing torpedoes launched.  
The officers on the bridge did not hear Morton’s alert. The consequences of this 
procedural failure were immediate and severe. It wasn’t until Able Seaman Thomas 
Quinn up in the Crow’s Nest spotted the torpedo only 200 yards away (12 seconds from 
impact) that warning of the torpedo speeding towards the liner was acknowledged.
81
 The 
strike could have been avoided if Leslie Morton had continued to shout warnings to the 
bridge and the officers had heard and acknowledged these warnings. By the time Thomas 
Quinn had his urgent warning acknowledged by the bridge, time had run out for the 
Lusitania. 
As it was, U20’s single torpedo struck near the number 1 boiler room below the 
waterline.  The open bulkhead doors in the engine room and elsewhere likely contributed 
to the rapid flooding of the ship, a loss of steerage control, and an inability to slow the 
ship down adequately to safely deploy lifeboats. The crew and passengers were 
unknowingly trapped in a closing vise.  On one side, the ship was sinking quickly, 
leaving little time - or margin for error - to get everyone off the ship. On the other side, 
the deployment of the only means of escape (Lusitania’s numerous lifeboats) was 
delayed by Turner’s hesitant order to abandon ship, by the ship’s residual speed & 
severity of list, and by the pronounced confusion on deck. Launching lifeboats while the 
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ship was traveling at such a high residual speed would have flooded the insides and 
spilled the passengers into the sea as soon as they touched the water.   
The Lusitania immediately began to list to the starboard side, compounding the 
rapidly deteriorating conditions. The ship’s list – which was eventually observed at 30o 
together with the ship’s speed made it nearly impossible to get the lifeboats safely in the 
water.
82
  The port side boats were unable to clear Lusitania’s protruding hull at a 30o list.  
Many of these boats where ripped apart as they were lowered over the rivets holding the 
ship’s steel hull plates in place, thus spilling or killing passengers and crew who fell 
helplessly into the sea. Only one boat was successfully launched from the port side.
83
 
In addition, the list was so severe that it made mobility on and below deck 
treacherous and time consuming.  Time was in short supply after the torpedo struck.  
With bulkheads closed near the ship’s main staircases, electric elevators were the only 
means of escape for many of the crew stationed below deck.
84
 Emergency generators 
engaged a few minutes after the torpedo’s explosion, but were disabled four minutes 
later.
85
 Many experienced seamen with critical responsibilities in the event of abandoning 
the ship, were trapped below deck, leaving gaps in the chain of command and the 
fulfillment of critical responsibilities.   Therefore, in addition to having little time and 
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carrying a full passenger manifest, the Lusitania did not have enough experienced sailors 
in position to effectively execute her abandonment.   
Panic and confusion engulfed the passengers despite the efforts of the 
(overwhelmed) crew. One passenger, Margaret Cox recalled, “everyone was just beating 
everybody” as passengers scrambled toward the boat deck.86 Chief First-Class Steward 
Robert Barnes was trying to keep passengers calm as they moved toward the main 
staircase. Barnes found that the initial calm dissolved quickly as the ship listed further.  
He later recounted, “It took us quite a few minutes to get up the stairs there was such a lot 
of people pushing and pulling their way up. I was calling out, “Take your time, she’s not 
going down”, but I really thought different.”87 The failure of the emergency generators 
plunged the interior of the ship into darkness and added to the terror. 
Lusitania’s list also impeded loading the starboard side lifeboats by complicating 
normal Promenade Deck operations. While passengers initially moved toward Promenade 
Deck stations for loading as they had been instructed, many realized any port-side escape 
from the ship would be impossible. As a result, passengers desperately seeking a way into 
a lifeboat overran the starboard side boat stations and their crews.  The list was so great 
that lifeboats swung out as if a pendulum from the upper Boat Deck.  Seeing the 
difficulty the crews had in bringing the lifeboats in close enough to the Promenade Deck 
for loading, many passengers scrambled up to the boat deck which was not equipped to 
accommodate - much less load - passengers.  This further impeded launching lifeboats 
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since the boat deck crew was required to redirect frightened passengers off of the Boat 
Deck and down already crowded stairwells.  This took an already depleted crew away 
from the essential task of releasing boats from their harnesses and carefully operating the 
winches to lower the boats to the Promenade Deck for loading. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ABANDON SHIP PROCEEDINGS 
 
 
Captain Turner delayed his order to abandon ship until several minutes after the 
torpedo struck the Lusitania. As the ship’s list exceeded 15o starboard, Turner ordered all 
lifeboats lowered to the rail.  He also ordered Staff Captain Anderson to supervise “all 
women and children first”88 and all remaining officers to the boat stations.  The wireless 
room was told to make immediate contact with the coastal naval station to request rescue 
operations be put underway immediately. 
Minutes later, Turner left the bridge in full uniform with a life jacket on, appeared 
on the upper deck, and reversed his orders to Anderson and the crews operating the 
winches.  He halted the lowering of the boats and ordered everyone out of them.
89
 Turner 
told passengers “that there was no danger and that the ship would float.”90 This order 
came ten minutes after the ship had been struck and only eight minutes before Lusitania 
would slip beneath the waves. It corresponded with a temporary, but pronounced 
reduction of the Lusitania’s list. The captain’s commands were not generally acted on, 
although some passengers did retreat to their staterooms, believing the worst had passed.   
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Despite an ample supply on board and the best efforts of the ship’s stewards to 
distribute them, many passengers were without lifejackets when they reached the lifeboat 
stations. Of those who had them, many were not able to properly secure their jacket in the 
panic that had ensued. Children were particularly vulnerable.  Stewards John Jones, 
Marian Bird, and Fannie Morecroft hurried from deck to deck calming passengers but 
also urging them to get to the higher decks with their lifejackets as soon as possible.  
They retrieved the lifejackets of forgetful and panicked passengers who were without 
them. The three also went back through each room of their sections to ensure no one was 
left behind.
91
 By most surviving passenger accounts, Lusitania’s stewards and staff 
comported themselves with courage and compassion throughout the ordeal of abandoning 
the ship. 
Lusitania carried lifejackets enough for 3,000 people and had lifeboat capacity for 
over 2,600. The ship’s safety inspection conducted prior to leaving New York 
documented the following manifest: 
● 22 life boats which carried 68 persons each 
● 20 Chambers collapsible boats carrying 54 each 
● 12 McLean-Chambers collapsible boats with a capacity of 49 each 
● 2 Henderson collapsible boats, carrying 43 each 
● 14 life rafts, with capacities varying from 20 to 40 each.
92
 
Most of the lifesaving apparatus of the ship went with her to the grave. The 
collapsible boats were particularly vulnerable to loss as the depleted crew focused on the 
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high capacity long boats that were ready for launch.  The collapsible boats had wooden 
bottoms and canvas sides which had to be pulled up and clipped into place with supports. 
This was a relatively time consuming and manpower-intensive prospect compared 
to the long boats. In addition, many of the collapsible boats were unable to be 
released from their rusted harnesses. 
Of the twenty-two “long boats”, only six were successfully launched, all but one 
from the starboard side.
93
 The crew attempted to launch two other port-side lifeboats but 
these did not survive the process of lowering and broke apart on the ships hull, casting all 
passengers and crew into the sea. 
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CHAPTER VII 
RESCUE & RECOVERY OPERATIONS 
 
 
At 2:11pm, the Lusitania’s distress signal was broadcast by wireless operators 
Robert Leith and David McCormick. The message read: 
 
“SOS, SOS, SOS. COME AT ONCE. BIG LIST. 10 MILES SOUTH OF OLD 
KINSALE. MFA”94 
 
The SOS call reached and was acknowledged by the various wireless stations 
located along the southern Irish coastline.  The message (requesting rescue) was then 
relayed and received by the wireless operator at the Queenstown Naval center some 
twenty-five miles away from the sinking vessel.
95
 The area commander - Vice Admiral 
Sir Charles H. Coke of the local Queenstown Patrol naval squadron whose duty was to 
patrol the waters around the port city - ordered all the patrol craft that were available at 
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the time to the scene of the disaster to assist in rescuing survivors.
96
 The Queenstown 
patrol included forty vessels varying in size and type including three old torpedo boats 
and a mixture of obsolete naval patrol craft and armed fishing trawlers.
97
 That afternoon, 
fourteen of these small and nimble craft offered superior handling and maneuverability 
than was available in the unofficial flagship of the squadron: the cruiser H.M.S. Juno.  
The Juno was the only Navy ship in the area capable of engaging the enemy.  
Author Colin Simpson argues that on the day before the attack, Vice Admiral Coke had 
ordered Juno to terminate its patrol to provide escort for the Lusitania.  However, the 
Juno’s escort mission was subsequently scuttled on Admiralty’s orders and she returned 
to port. The Admiralty had calculated that although available, the Juno presented a large 
and vulnerable target to the German submarines believed to be patrolling nearby. Should 
the German U-boats take out the Juno, an essential shipping lane would be exposed to 
nearly unimpeded enemy control until a replacement warship could be dispatched from 
the North Atlantic Theater. Although logical and consistent, Simpson’s assertions 
regarding the Juno have never been substantiated by those directly involved in the 
Lusitania affair. 
It seems likely that, facing the prospect of potentially altering the balance of 
power along the Irish coast, the Admiralty rescinded two of Admiral Coke’s orders in 
less than three hours. One order (the rescinded order for Juno to provide escort) may have 
prevented the attack or otherwise limited the damage and subsequent loss of life.  The 
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other, which we explore further, may have enhanced recovery operations once the ship 
was lost. It seems reasonable to conclude that if either of Admiral Coke’s orders where 
allowed to stand, Lusitania’s severe loss of life may have been mitigated, if not avoided 
entirely.  
The rescue operation began almost immediately after receiving the relayed 
distress call from Leith and McCormick onboard the Lusitania. Admiral Coke ordered 
the cruiser Juno, steamers Blubell & Flying Fish, tugs Warrior, Stormcock, & Julia, and 
5 trawlers to the reported area where the Lusitania disaster was unfolding.
98
 Coke was 
also aware that numerous small fishing craft were also being dispatched to the scene.  
However, at 3pm, the Admiralty interceded (perhaps) for the second time that day 
to recall the Juno. Having received and executed Admiralty’s orders, Coke was now 
resigned to the fact that the smaller craft would be the British Navy’s representation at 
the scene of the disaster which unfolded with the Lusitania.
99
 Coke’s most substantive 
ship remained in port.  He did not know at the time that the Lusitania was gone at 2:28 
that afternoon, seventeen minutes after issuing her first distress call. 
 The Wanderer – a small, private fishing boat from the nearby Island of Man – 
was the first to the scene. The Wanderer managed to rescue nearly 200 survivors and 
towed two of the six lifeboats recovered eight miles to where it was intercepted and 
relieved by the Navy tug Flying Fish. Such would be the pattern for the remainder of 
rescue operations.  Smaller boats would move into and around the debris field picking up 
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survivors, as well as the dead. Without a sufficiently large vessel on the scene to accept 
survivors, the few lifeboats in service were towed to safety but were not able to be 
returned to the disaster site in time to further assist with the operations. 
Some historians such as Thomas Bailey and Paul Ryan speculate that the cruiser 
Juno, with its long length, wide berth, and relatively fast cruising speed would indeed 
have been able to rescue a larger number of survivors more quickly than the smaller 
squadron and civilian craft scrambled from port that day. The Juno was reported to have 
had a design speed of 19.5 knots (equivalent to 22mph) under full steam and it would 
have been able to make it to the area of the sinking within an hour and a half of being 
ordered out of Queenstown. As it was, the first of Vice Admiral Coke’s rescue craft 
reached the perimeter of the debris field approximately two hours after the Lusitania had 
disappeared from sight.
100
 The Juno was ordered out to the disaster area by Vice Admiral 
Coke soon after the wireless distress message was received at Queenstown even though it 
was against British Admiralty wartime protocol. Vice Admiral Coke ignored protocol and 
wanted instead to send every available craft to the scene of the sinking to assist in the 
rescue of survivors. The Juno left the harbor at 3:00pm and came upon Roche Point 
which was less than 20 miles away from the survivors when she was abruptly ordered 
back to Queenstown by Vice Admiral Coke.
101
 Coke’s intention in sending out the Juno 
to the Lusitania was for it to aid in the transfer of passengers from the various small craft 
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on the scene that could then be quickly redeployed back into the debris field to search for 
more survivors.  
 Therefore in Coke’s view, the Juno was integral to maximizing the modest assets 
available to the rescue operation. Thirty minutes after the Juno left Queenstown harbor, 
Coke learned by wireless that the Lusitania had already disappeared. Although he 
executed the Admiralty’s orders to have Juno return to port, he was uncertain that the 
other craft in the area would be able to effectively rescue survivors on their own.
102
 What 
the Vice Admiral was certain of however, was the existence of the imminent U-boat 
threat that was underscored by Lusitania’s misfortune.  Germany had previously 
torpedoed rescue vessels during evacuation and rescue procedures. The Juno might suffer 
a similar fate and this could have tactical consequences for the conduct of the blockade.   
The patrol flotilla was joined outside the harbor by a British steamer the SS 
Westborough which was flying Greek colors and sported the name Katrina as a 
submarine deterrent.
103
  Ironically, the strategy that the Lusitania once employed to 
escape torpedo attack was being used on a ship that arrived on the scene of the 
Lusitania’s demise from the same weapon.  
Various small fishing vessels, tugs, and tenders made up the additional units 
heading to the Lusitania’s last known position. One of the craft unique to the situation 
was the Courtmacsherry Lifeboat which had set out at 3pm with 12 men rowing furiously 
towards the position of the Lusitania’s sinking.  The Courtmacsherry was quickly 
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deployed after being alerted by its coxswain mate who had witnessed the sinking on 
shore and rushed to gather the crew.
104
 The Courtmacsherry Lifeboat would take three 
hours to reach the scene of the disaster.  It would recover more deceased victims than 
survivors. 
Owing to the rapid submergence of the Lusitania, only six lifeboats in various 
forms of damage and decay would be towed to Queenstown.
105
 The number of survivors 
occupying the lifeboats depended on a range of factors. The hulls of several lifeboats 
were compromised during their release (descent) from the ship and were unable to 
support their specified capacity. Others were partially swamped due to overloading and 
the panic of those trying to climb into them from the water.  
The water temperature in the Irish Sea at the time was approximately 52
o
. 
Hypothermia set in quickly for those in the water, but also affected those in partially 
submerged lifeboats. At that temperature, exhaustion or unconsciousness set in within 30-
60 minutes.  Since Lusitania was without escort, the closest rescue vessels were at best, 
two hours away.  This meant that anyone fortunate enough to have gotten off the ship and 
to have survived Lusitania’s rush to the sea bottom, was in grave danger if not in a 
lifeboat. Survival times for the average person in water of that temperature is roughly 
between 1 – 3 hours, depending on their clothing and whether or not a lifejacket was 
secured. Without a lifejacket, exhaustion or unconsciousness would likely mean death by 
drowning. The onset of hypothermia and eventual drowning would have been accelerated 
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by the chilly water temperature of the early Spring and by the low position of the sun in 
the sky that afternoon. 
Given the distance and time Lusitania’s rescuers had to cover from Queenstown, 
the inability of Lusitania’s crew to ensure that each passenger had properly donned a 
lifejacket directly impacted the number of survivors. Both passenger and crew accounts 
of the disaster refer to significant numbers of people with improperly worn lifejackets or 
without them at all.  Of the 1,201 victims of the Lusitania disaster, only 289 bodies were 
recovered.
106
 This suggests that a large number of people were unaccounted for as they 
were either trapped on the ship or in the water without a lifejacket as Lusitania went 
down. Those in the water in close vicinity to the ship were most likely pulled to the 
bottom by the effect of the siphon created by the ship as it descended. 
An example of the dangers inherent in spending too much time in cold waters is 
highlighted by the case of Lusitania survivor Mrs. Mabel Henshaw. Mrs. Henshaw 
escaped the Lusitania with a lifejacket correctly fastened on her. However, within a short 
time the cold temperatures began giving her painful cramps throughout her body. 
Wracked with pain and exhausted, Henshaw was forced to lie on her back in the water 
before she lost consciousness.
107
 After being pulled from the water by the steamer Blue 
Bell, Mrs. Henshaw was mistaken by crewmembers for a dead body and placed in a pile 
of other corpses.  The blanket covering the bodies warmed Mrs. Henshaw’s body 
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temperature enough so that she awoke and caught the eye of the crewmembers by making 
enough movement to differentiate herself from the lifeless forms surrounding her.
108
 
The loss of consciousness in the bitter sea that afternoon was a frequent 
occurrence for those in the water. If countermeasures weren’t already in place - such as a 
correctly fastened lifejacket or being otherwise secured to an object that had good 
buoyancy – unconsciousness and subsequent death by drowning occurred long before 
rescue boats arrived. Twenty-one year old Doris Maud Charles who was with her father, 
forty-eight year old Joseph Charles on the return voyage to their home in England, lost 
consciousness after some time swimming in the water with her father connected by 
locked arms. Miss Charles was saved from certain drowning because of both her father’s 
treading of water and sometime later, a partially filled lifeboat from the ship came 
alongside them. The lifeboat passengers recognized the father and daughter’s peril and 
helped them both to safety.
109
 The kindness of others, particularly the Lusitania crew 
member manning the lifeboat allowed the Charles’s to escape the fate of most others in 
their situation.  The lifeboat continued to dutifully search for movement among the 
bodies in the water, but few had survived as long as Doris Charles and her father. 
Eventually, the lifeboat containing the Charles’s and others was towed to safety by the 
tug Flying Fish. 
The forty year old Boston bookseller Charles Lauriat found and boarded a heavily 
damaged collapsible lifeboat.  Lauriat was a first class passenger and along with fellow 
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American passenger Fred Gauntlett, forty-five, and twenty-seven year old British seaman 
James Brooks managed to jerry-rig the boat into an operational condition.
110
 All three 
men took turns rowing the compromised, and barely seaworthy craft towards land while 
picking up dozens of survivors. The lifeboat was still some miles from shore when the 
boat was overtaken by the  local fishing vessel Peel 12 and the survivors were taken 
aboard.
111
 According to the testimony of Charles Lauriat, this small fishing vessel was 
already grossly overcrowded with survivors having taken onboard the passengers from 
two other lifeboats beforehand. The Peel’s crew still took the survivors of Charles 
Lauriat’s boat aboard even though it was risking the lives of all.112 The decision to take 
aboard additional persons to an already overcrowded fishing vessel can be attributed 
more to the uncommon humanity of the vessel’s crew - hardworking fishermen who 
risked drowning themselves to save the lives of those unfortunate souls onboard the 
Lusitania. Such selfless acts had and would continue to be replicated by crews of the 
rescue craft, Lusitania’s lifeboats, and many of survivors themselves.  
Among the survivors, American Charles Lauriat exemplified the best of the 
selfless and the brave. In addition, his compassion and powers of observation gave the 
world a rich account of what happened that afternoon.  Lauriat himself noted the supreme 
and selfless generosity of the fisherman aboard the Peel 12 that day - loaning the 
passengers blankets, starting a fire from the ship’s heater and placing chilled persons 
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around it, and giving exhausted survivors food and warm tea. As the first vessel on the 
scene, the captain of the Peel 12 continued to attend to the rescue site searching for 
additional persons still in the water before eventually heading back to Queenstown.
113
  
Fifty-two year old British passenger Elizabeth Duckworth had been rowing 
Lusitania’s lifeboat number 21 before she was also intercepted by the Peel 12.  She 
requested that the Peel’s captain turn the fishing boat some distance off course to rescue 
additional survivors she believed were alive in the water.  She was denied the request 
allegedly due to the Peel’s manpower constraints. Upon being informed of the denial, 
Mrs. Duckworth and three male companions jumped back into their lifeboat and rowed 
out to rescue an additional 40 survivors from the water. Upon return to the Peel, 
Duckworth and her shipmates were welcomed by Peel’s crew cheering her bravery and 
courage.
114
 In all, the Peel 12 took on 160 survivors, many with their legs hanging over 
the sides due to the cramped conditions before being transferred to the larger and more 
stable side paddlewheel Flying Fish for the return journey to Queenstown.
115
 
As corroborated by the eyewitness accounts of the events surrounding the rescue 
of Lusitania survivors, the courage and will of passengers was not always able to 
overcome the long wait for rescue and the strength-sapping temperature of the water.  
The British Admiralty had failed to adequately protect the Lusitania.  Despite knowledge 
of an active U-boat presence, the Admiralty also failed to prepare adequate contingencies 
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for a rescue mission if Lusitania was stricken.  Vice Admiral Coke’s possible order for 
Lusitania to divert away from finishing the voyage at Liverpool and head immediately to 
Queenstown was too little, too late. It is true that the ship sank exceptionally fast (18 
minutes). This affected the number of lifeboats successfully launched as well as the 
number of lifejackets distributed and worn. These two factors alone do not necessarily 
explain Lusitania’s massive loss of life. Had the Admiralty been better prepared for an 
incident they hoped to avoid, the evidence suggests more lives would have been saved. 
There are several accounts of Lusitania crew members who, while struggling to 
save their own lives, took great personal risk in helping passengers into boats or 
retrieving for them floating objects on which could safely extend their exposure to the 
cold water. Lott Gadd was the ship’s barber who had heroically, but unsuccessfully tried 
to lower a loaded lifeboat away from the ship.  Gadd found himself in the water when the 
ship went down. In the aftermath, he came across a lifebuoy which he shared with four 
other survivors until a damaged collapsible lifeboat came into view.  The five men 
boarded the lifeboat, selected Gadd as their leader, and began picking survivors out of the 
water.
116
 A ship’s officer, Charles Bowring and another officer climbed into a 
waterlogged lifeboat which they bailed out frantically with their hands. They then spent 
the next few hours diving in the water and bringing survivors back into the boat.
117
 First 
Officer Arthur Jones took command of a damaged and overloaded boat after dragging 
passenger Isaac Lehmann for hours in the water.  After handing over Lehmann and other 
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survivors to safety, Jones ordered both lifeboats back out to begin searching for and 
picking up additional survivors.
118
 Able Seaman Thomas O’Mahoney and another 
seaman got aboard a collapsible boat and began picking up survivors out of the water.
119
 
Ship’s Carpenter Neil Robertson helped a drowning American into a damaged, 
collapsible lifeboat.
120
 
Not all crew members distinguished themselves with bravery. These included 
fireman and stokers in lifeboats despite the order for women and children first.  Firemen 
and stokers worked in the bowels of the ship and would not have been expected to 
survive a torpedo strike such as the one that doomed Lusitania.  Most of the engine room 
crew did not survive.  Nor were they expected to.  The fireman and stokers were observed 
slowly rowing away from the ship despite the instruction to move as quickly as possible 
to find survivors and to avoid the siphon of the ship as it went down.  There are also 
incidences where small groups of able-bodied survivors as well as certain crewmembers 
refused to give up their lifebelts to passengers – including women and children.121 During 
the Mersey Inquiry investigation into the sinking, a resigned Captain Turner hurt 
Cunard’s seamanship credentials by expressing his disappointment in the conduct of his 
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crew. He elaborated that the crew did not resemble much in the way of the sailors he 
knew from old times; they required much practice.
122
 
Such examples however, were more the exception, rather than the rule. The 
mortality rate amongst the crew was nearly 60%. This meant that four hundred and 
thirteen of seven hundred original crew members lost their lives trying to save the ship. 
The implications were catastrophic as there were not enough experienced officers or 
senior crew members who survived the sinking to take charge of the situation and remedy 
the failure of the chain of command inherent among the lower ranking crewmembers.
123
 
The story of the aftermath of the sinking of the R.M.S. Lusitania is heavily 
overshadowed by the seemingly preventable loss of life that occurred in the liner’s final 
moments. On balance, the Admiralty’s inability to protect one of the most valuable 
passenger ships in the world and to quickly respond to its mistake seems inexcusable. 
The captain and crew’s inability to spot the torpedo and take evasive action, to slow the 
boat once it was hit, or to shift ballast in order to more quickly correct the list and safely 
launch lifeboats are the primary explanation for the severe loss of life.  In each case, the 
captain’s judgment or the crew’s seamanship or both can be called into question. 
The actions of lower ranking crewmembers such as the ship’s Barber Lott Gadd 
or the Able Seaman Thomas O’Mahoney or the various passengers such as Charles 
Lauriat or Elizabeth Duckworth dominate the eyewitness accounts. Although rescue and 
recovery operations began immediately upon receipt of the Lusitania’s distress signal, 
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Queenstown was not prepared to rescue a ship in trouble that far out to sea. The 
Admiralty rescinded Vice Admiral Coke’s orders that most likely would have affected 
the body count.  Captain Turner neglected his orders regarding course and speed.  Turner 
had furthermore lost his position in the morning fog, a circumstance that allowed U-20 to 
close quickly and strike with devastating results.  
It seems, once in the water that rank lost all meaning.  The crew of the Lusitania 
performed bravely and not without making the ultimate sacrifice to have others overcome 
the hand they were dealt.  Rescuers and survivors themselves were the real heroes that 
day. 
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CHAPTER VIII   
PUBLIC SENTIMENT & THE MARCH TOWARD WAR 
 
 
An examination of American sentiment before and after Lusitania was destroyed 
is necessary to establish the role that the disaster and loss of life played in the American 
entrance into the war. The American press was a primary influence and registrar of public 
sentiment immediately following the attack.  
In the Fall of 1914, some six months before the disaster, public sentiment in the 
United States regarding the war was that it was Europe’s war to fight.  Americans 
continued commerce with England, Germany, and the other nations at war. British, 
French, and early in the war German naval assets patrolled American ports along the 
eastern seaboard from international waters, The New York Times noted in August that 
two French cruisers (Conde, Descartes), three British (Berwick, Essex, and Lancaster), 
and three German (Dresden, Strausburg, and Karlsruhe) were off the New York and 
Boston coasts.
124
 The British cruiser Essex had just finished escorting the White Star liner 
Olympic on the final leg of its journey across the Atlantic to New York harbor. In doing 
so, the newspaper noted that it sailed past the three German warships, which were clearly 
“outclassed”. 
                                                 
124
 "Cunarder Slips Out; Will Pick Up British Cruisers as Escorts." New York Times, August 5, 1914. 
  
86 
Americans believed the superiority of the British Navy would be a deciding factor 
in the conduct and outcome of the war, and that superiority would insure safe passage of 
the commerce between Europe and the United States.  However, they were occasionally 
reminded of the dangers of trans-Atlantic travel while traveling aboard passenger liners.  
On an August 5
th
 Lusitania voyage, “all passengers were notified that all stateroom lights 
must be blanketed when the vessel passed Ambrose Channel.”  Furthermore, although 
“passengers were allowed on deck, they were warned that no lights must be shown.”125 
Trans-Atlantic passengers disembarking in America also carried perspectives on 
the war that the newspaper’s elaborated on for a fairly disinterested public. “Sir James 
Barrie Looks for Long War” was the title of a page four article in the September 18th 
New York Times. Barrie was a British playwright visiting the United States.  He fielded 
questions from reporters ranging from the technical (the kind of bullets the Germans were 
reported to be using) to the political (usefulness of peace talks).  Barrie declared 
Germany “a magnificent nation” and speculated that the war was “ a revolt against 
(Germany’s systemic) militarism and the Emperor was not wholly to blame”.  This was a 
relieving and disarming testimony for a pacifist America.  
Major Talbot Aldrich of Boston was a retired but distinguished US cavalry officer 
and in Belgium when the war began. He arrived in New York on board the Lusitania on 
September 17, 1914. The New York Times interviewed Aldrich and many others upon 
their departure from the ship. His assessment that “if not for the check at Liege, the 
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Kaiser’s army would have been in Paris within two weeks after the war started,” was 
buried deep into its article – paragraph 17 of 19.126 
The newspapers of the time also monitored German ocean liner traffic into and 
out of American ports. Another 1914 Times article in the same edition covering 
Lusitania’s September arrival, highlighted German liners Barbarossa and Brandenburg 
eluding British and French cruisers.  The Brandenburg slipped out of Philadelphia in 
August and was following a northern route to Trondhjem, Norway.  Similarly, the 
Barbarossa of Lloyd Lines lay in Hoboken, New Jersey for many weeks before receiving 
clearance to move its 2,000 tons of coal to Europe. The Barbarossa slipped out of 
Hoboken to Gravesend Bay where she waited for English cruisers to leave the area.
127
 
Prior to the outbreak of war, newspapers covered the Lusitania as a modern, 
technological marvel.  This created an air of absolute confidence about the ship and 
Cunard itself.  At the turn of the century, Lusitania was heralded as “The Greatest 
Steamship Ever Built.”128 Articles featured its size, speed, and safety accommodations – 
some of which were the result of the Titanic disaster some five years earlier.  “Were 
Lusitania to be stood on its end it would almost equal the combined height of New 
York’s tallest skyscrapers: the Park Row, the St Paul, and the Flat Iron.”129 Days after 
launch, engineers marveled at her horsepower (70,000) and indicated top speed (26.5 
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knots).  Ironically, according to the New York Times, the “greatest luxury of travel 
promised in the ship is its absolute freedom from vibration – considered the greatest 
inconvenience to fast travel on the Atlantic.”130 
The breakthrough in passenger comfort and liner speed was the result of the 
enormous turbines designed specifically for Lusitania.  These required considerable coal 
consumption and therefore oversized coalbunkers for storage.  It is believed by some 
historians that the “second” torpedo strike was actually the thunderous explosion of one 
of Lusitania’s massive coal bunkers. Provided that this assumption is correct, it is ironic 
that technology intended to extend the ultimate in passenger comfort, may have indirectly 
contributed to Lusitania’s acute loss of life. 
The Lusitania’s many safety features were also celebrated by public record.  
Following the loss of the Titanic, Volturno, and the Empress of Ireland, several structural 
features as well as operating protocols were put into operation as requirements for 
passenger liners. For example, the Lusitania was built with a double bottom hull and 
wireless technology that could reach 100 miles in distress conditions.
131
 In addition, 
Lusitania was engineered to have enough lifeboats for over one hundred percent of its 
passenger & crew capacity.  This was a highly controversial provision, as noted by the 
New York Times in 1907.   
Most experienced captains are against carrying one 
hundred percent capacity and say that such a large 
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number of boats on the upper decks would be 
impossible to fully deploy and in fact impede 
lifesaving due to overcrowding on the deck.
132
 
 
Fresh from the Titanic disaster, the public may not have fully appreciated the 
referenced captain’s caution.  To the public, one can easily imagine the sentiment that the 
more lifeboats - the better.  Unfortunately, the Lusitania reinforced the captain’s 
prophecy. 
Due to newspaper coverage prior to the Lusitania setting sail for Liverpool on the 
last voyage of her life, the Lusitania was a recognized, if not celebrated ship for most 
Americans. Britain’s naval strength put her in control of the seas.  Liners such as the 
Lusitania could easily outrun most German warships and submarines.  The submarines 
themselves seemingly failed to halt big liners.  “The general view in maritime circles is 
that the big ships with high speed run comparatively little danger from submarines.”133. 
This view was in fact demonstrated by the U-20 itself during the same mission that sank 
the Lusitania, where Kapitanluetant Schweiger pursued and unsuccessfully fired upon an 
undisclosed White Star Line ship. The torpedo missed its target due to the high speed of 
its intended victim. The steamship lines themselves added to the air of invincibility by 
showing no alarm for the safety of their ships. Cunard reportedly said that it “saw no 
reason to make any alterations in its programed sailings” despite the warnings issued by 
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Germany.
134
 Despite the explicit German warning to the Lusitania published in the New 
York Times on the day of her departure out of New York, few passengers canceled their 
trip. 
With public opinion cultivated by newspaper coverage reflecting Lusitania as an 
“invincible” ship, together with the conflict overseas depicted as a long and wholly 
European war, American pacifism prevailed leading up to the Lusitania disaster.  
Immediately following the Lusitania’s sinking, neither of these conditioned perspectives 
remained intact.  The facts before then were that the United States was firmly a neutral 
nation, that Lusitania was a fast ship with an experienced crew, and that Germany had yet 
to establish submarine warfare as a significant weapons system to be feared.  None of the 
major passenger lines had interrupted their cruise schedules nor reduced the number of 
crossings that they offered. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that only a half dozen 
cancellations were recorded for passage on the Lusitania after the German Embassy 
published an explicit warning. The warning was published in the New York Times the 
same day the ship left New York for Liverpool. 
The coverage of the war in US newspapers seemed anecdotal by modern standards.   
Europe’s conflicts were seemingly frequent; America’s involvement in them was not. In 
the sixty-five year history between 1849 up to World War I, Europe experienced thirty 
wars and fewer than a dozen years of peace. The US was an ascending - but not yet 
established - naval power and its ability to project that power was not a broad 
consideration by the public.  Before Lusitania went down, it is likely that Germany and 
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Austria-Hungary’s war with Britain and France seemed a distant and familiar curiosity to 
the average American.  
Newspaper articles immediately following the disaster reflect American’s surprise 
and disbelief that the Lusitania had actually been sunk. 
135
 The political implications of 
the disaster were preeminent immediately following news of the attack. Speculation and 
rumor filled the information vacuum created by distance and by the complicated rescue 
operation. 
 Perhaps the initial fascination with the politics of the attack - most specifically 
Washington’s reaction to it - can be partially explained by the fact that the true scale of 
the disaster was not accounted for in the first days following the attack. Early Cunard 
accounts indicated that all on board had been saved. Given what the public and Cunard 
knew of the Lusitania’s engineering and its crew, this was reassuring and not unexpected 
news. “This information was given out to the people waiting in the Cunard office and 
many of them went home”135  
Cunard officials were also struggling with confirming the exact passenger 
manifest.
136
  The newspaper reported that due to alterations and additions made close to 
launch, the exact passenger and crew count was not confirmed until the day after its 
sinking. It was then reported that there were 1,253 passengers from New York including 
some 200 transferred from the Cameronia in New York after she was placed under 
Admiralty control that morning for use as a merchant cruiser.  The Admiralty-ordered 
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transfer had the effect of delaying Lusitania’s launch by two and one half hours. 
Historians put little relevance of the transfer other than adding to the Lusitania’s death 
toll and revealing the extent to which the British Admiralty controlled private passenger 
ships.
137
 However, authors Thomas Bailey and Paul Ryan note that the fatalists contend 
that if Lusitania had not been delayed, her fateful rendezvous with U-20 may have been 
under different circumstances, if it would have happened at all. 
Judging from newspaper accounts, foremost in the public interest on May 8
th
 was the 
potential commercial implications of the disaster.  Although an exact passenger count 
remained elusive, the American public were fully informed of the value of the ship and 
its cargo - to the dollar.
138
 Headlines underscored the commercial losses and reported the 
insurance coverage carried by Cunard on Lusitania as well as the guarantees taken out by 
New York companies with goods and merchandise on board.
139
  Coverage such as this 
may be attributed to the local concentration of risk.  It was reported that over have the 
assets insured on the Lusitania were done so by New York firms.
140
 
It would take the next several days before the public began to learn about the details 
of the attack from survivors’ published accounts.141 From these accounts, Americans 
were introduced to stories of survival, the ineffectiveness of lifeboats, and a good deal of 
speculation as to the missing’s demise.142 
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It was perhaps an ironic admission by the New York Times that one of the most 
celebrated characteristics of the Lusitania – her speed – was in fact complicit in her lost 
of life.
143
  Without the ability to reverse engines, a fast ship is difficult to slow. Lusitania 
was without recourse. It could neither speed up to cover the distance to a safe harbor (or 
intentional grounding) nor slow down enough to launch lifeboats.  The public learned that 
their esteemed and “invincible” ship went down essentially without a fight in less than 
twenty minutes.  
Newspapers began to shift coverage the following week and focused attention on the 
multiple acts of heroism witnessed or imagined by survivors and rescuers.
144
 The public 
learned that half the ship’s life boats were never effectively launched due to delay in 
orders given and the inability of the crew to level the ship
145
 Reports detailed the great 
loss of life extracted by prolonged exposure in cold water
146
 
The stories being relayed back to America were so incongruent to the public’s 
perception of the ship, little attention was paid to the act of war the Germans had 
effected.  In the succeeding days the newspapers instead sought to resolve how such a 
disaster could have been thrust upon such a magnificent ship.  Headlines seemed to rule 
out some factors while still speculating on others.
147
 The Captain’s credentials - 46 years 
as a sailor - were buried deep in the newspaper and only made brief reference to.
148
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Finally, as the days rolled on, public sentiment was steered away from the crime or 
the perpetrator and was instead directed towards the Admiralty, Cunard, and the ship’s 
crew
149
 Experts crticized the ship’s course and the crew’s discipline150   
On the 18
th
 of May, the British Board of Trade announced a formal investigation of 
the circumstances attending the loss of the Lusitania would be held beginning June 15, 
1915. The investigation – later known as the Mersey Inquiry – produced over three 
hundred pages of testimony from the ship’s officers and crew, from survivors, and from 
naval experts.  The Inquiry and its final report concluded that “the whole blame for the 
cruel destruction of life rested with those who plotted and with who committed the 
crime.”151  
On one level, such a conclusion was - if not predictable - politically convenient. It 
obscured or deflected accountablilities of the Admiralty, of Cunard, and of Lusitania’s 
leadership and crew. It had the effect of shifting the narrative of the incident from one of 
disbelief to one of outrage. The Mersey Inquiry, however intended, proved to set a 
cornerstone in the argument that would eventually help turn American public sentiment 
toward the war in Europe.   
The Mersey Inquiry carried out its work over six hearings across four weeks’ time. 
The Inquiry called 36 witnesses and the British Wreck Commissioner himself Lord Baron 
Mersey asked and interpreted all questions and responses. Some of the hearings allowed 
cameras present which seemed to serve to enhance the drama unfolding. The fact that the 
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commission focused little on the action and inaction of the Captain and crew had the 
effect of stopping short of completely exonerating Captain Turner and his crew.  
No doubt there were mishaps in handling the ropes of 
the boats and in other such matters, but there was, in 
my opinion, no incompetence or neglect. I am satisfied 
that the crew behaved well throughout and worked 
with skill and judgment. 
I find that the conduct of the masters, the officers, and 
the crew was satisfactory.  They did their best under 
difficult and perilous circumstances.
152
  
 Some historians such as Eric Sauder and J. Kent Layton view the Mersey 
commission with disappointment.  It fed the newspaper’s appetite for spectacle, but its 
conclusions were circumstantial at best.  The public continued to suspect incompetence 
on the part of Turner for failure to follow all the safety guidelines. Lord Mersey 
acknowledged that the Captain “was fully advised as to the means which in the view of 
the Admiralty were best calculated to avert the disaster.”153 The Commission also 
concluded that in some respects the captain did not follow the advice given to him.  
However, the Commission suggested that the Admiralty’s instructions were meant for 
serious and careful consideration, not as uncontested orders.  The captain was expected to 
exercise his skilled judgment when it came to the difficult questions arising from the 
navigation of his ship.  The concluding Mersey report seemed to be saying that the 
Admiralty was not to be held to account because the safe passage of any ship depended 
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on the judgment of its captain.  Commissioner Mersey further suggested that Captain 
Turner and the crew of the Lusitania should not be held responsible for his judgment in 
the Lusitania disaster because the circumstances were difficult and “They did their best in 
difficult and perilous circumstances and their best was good”.154 This would have hardly 
seemed a sufficient explanation to those trying to account for what happened: 
He exercised his judgment for the best.  It was the 
judgment of a skilled and experienced man, and 
although others may have acted differently and 
perhaps more successfully, he ought not, in my 
opinion, be blamed.
155
 
Following the Lusitania disaster, American public opinion was shaped by newspaper 
coverage and by the Mersey Inquiry.  The fact that their were almost 200 Americans 
onboard the Lusitania when she was torpedoed was buried deep in the early editions of 
the New York Times.
156
  In contrast, articles on the potential insurance losses and 
speculation on challenges to Alfred Vanderbuilt’s Last Will and Testament captured page 
one attention.
157
  The Mersey report addressed various popular conspiracies such as the 
speed of the ship, the deployment of safety measures, and suspicions of Lusitania’s 
cargo.  Most of the Admiralty’s orders remained sealed during the commission (and for 
some decades afterward).  Into this information vacuum evolved new theories including 
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the Admiralty intentionally putting Americans in harm’s way in order to drag American 
industrial and military might into the war. 
These all suggest that in 1915, Americans saw Lusitania’s fate more as a nautical 
disaster than an attack; more similar to Titanic (1912) than the Maine (1898).  The loss of 
American life did not ignite outrage or a direct move toward war. That would come some 
two years later.  Instead, Lusitania was a jarring wake-up call to isolationist America that 
the war in Europe did indeed have consequences for the United States. It reinforced the 
view that it might be a long war in which it would be difficult to remain neutral 
throughout. Finally, for America it introduced a brutal and deadly weapon (the 
submarine) which called into question the long-established rules of war at sea and 
paradoxically challenged both the country’s isolation as well as its ability to project its 
rising military and industrial power. Two years later America would declare war on 
Germany immediately following the sinking of four American merchant ships by U-boats 
that had violated the neutrality of the United States. 
Politically, the Lusitania disaster was an incident that supported US President 
Wilson’s emerging formulation of an international body to resolve disputes and attribute 
accountability.  Tactically, May 7, 1915 marked an inflection point in Germany’s conduct 
of submarine warfare and the American public’s interest in it.  For the next twelve 
months, average Allied naval losses to U-boat attacks doubled to 150,000 tons each 
month. (Exhibit III, Page 43) The expansion of the German U-boat program continued to 
escalate until April, 1917 – a month in which Allied forces lost nearly 900,000 tons of 
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maritime assets.  Perhaps not unrelated, on April 2, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson 
asked Congress to declare war on Germany and the United States entered World War I.  
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CHAPTER IX 
 SUMMARY & CONCLUSION 
 
 
By any account, the sinking of the Lusitania by a single torpedo launched from 
Germany’s U-20 is a significant historical event.  The ultimate accountability for the 
remarkable loss of life fell on the German war machine.  However, this research has 
served to separate the act of war from the actions of the ship’s command and control 
infrastructure and the seamanship of its crew. This distinction is made underscoring the 
thesis that more lives could have and should have been saved. While histories of the 
Lusitania do not lay culpability at the feet of the crew and captain, both should be held to 
account for the elevated loss of life in the hostile sinking of this magnificent ship on May 
7, 1915.   
It was a tragedy foretold by its instigator.  The German government issued 
warnings before Lusitania sailed and did so in a very public way.  The British and 
American government, the ship’s operating company Cunard, as well as some of 
Lusitania’s passengers and crew were aware of the threat.  For example, the British 
Admiralty - who controlled all Allied ships within or passing through the warzone – took 
the threat seriously enough to commandeer the Cameronia and transfer its passengers to 
the Lusitania. 
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The ship was a technological marvel of its day and had compelling advantages 
over its pursuer. Unfortunately, Lusitania’s considerable advantages were neutralized by 
negligence and misjudgment, by the weather, and by overriding commercial interests. 
The U-20’s effectiveness was enhanced by Lusitania’s misfortune and ineptitude as well 
as certain inaction on the part of Admiralty.   
The bridge was warned of the approaching torpedo in time to affect evasive 
action, but did not hear the alert.  Despite eight or more look-outs posted by the captain, 
calm seas and clear visibility; only one seaman – assigned to the forecastle - spotted the 
torpedo with enough time to avert the strike.  That seaman neglected his duty after only 
one alert to the bridge, and left his post without ensuring Lusitania’s officers 
acknowledged receipt.  The remaining look-outs saw the torpedo approximately twelve 
seconds from impact, too little time to avoid the disaster.   
Although she sank quickly, Lusitania was outfitted with abundant safety 
equipment and modern design features that should have allowed for the safe evacuation 
of all its passengers and crew (those who survived the torpedo’s impact).  These features 
were well publicized and practiced with help from the lessons learned from the legendary 
Titanic’s sinking years earlier.  Double-hulled with flooding-compartmentalization 
further secured by water-tight bulkheads, Lusitania’s design made her fast enough to 
avoid attack and doubly seaworthy should an attack catch her by surprise.  In other 
words, Lusitania (like Titanic) was thought unsinkable. Eighteen minutes after being 
struck by a single torpedo, the presumably unsinkable Lusitania slipped out of sight 
beneath the waves. 
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It is unclear whether it was this misplaced confidence in the ship itself or other 
circumstances that delayed the order by Captain William Thomas Turner to abandon 
ship, but Lusitania’s crew had but ten minutes to effect an order involving almost two 
thousand people (1,959). The crew was unable to mobilize passengers with sufficient 
instruction to properly don most of the 2,100 lifejackets – the primary lifesaving 
instrument on board, although evidence exists of some heroic crewmembers sacrificing 
their vests to save others. 
With so many passengers without properly secured lifejackets, the deployment of 
Lusitania’s (abundant) lifeboat capacity was paramount.  Ironically, two of the ship’s 
considerable advantages – her size and speed - conspired to further limit abandonment 
procedures.   
The crew had properly followed Admiralty orders when the ship entered the 
designated submarine war zone to swing all davits for the twenty-two lifeboats out away 
from the ship so that they could quickly be lowered in the event of an attack.  These boats 
had a rated capacity of 1,400 passengers: the capacity in and of themselves to save over 
70% of those onboard the Lusitania.  A similar order to unlatch retaining harnesses of the 
forty-eight collapsible lifeboats was over-ridden by Captain Turner.  As a result, nearly 
all the collapsible lifeboat capacity (totaling over 2,000 passengers) went down still 
strapped to the ship. 
Because of the size and speed of the ship, the captain and his crew were unable to 
control the list of the Lusitania or slow its surface speed enough to immediately launch its 
lifeboats.  The crew had difficulty organizing panicked passengers who were crowding 
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the upper decks desperate to get into lifeboats.  As the ship slowed, its list increased until 
it was no longer practical to deploy any boats from the port side. The passengers were 
told to disembark from all lifeboats on the port side of the ship and those that did rushed 
into the pandemonium on the starboard side.  In the end, the crew was able to deploy only 
six of the twenty-two high-capacity lifeboats. 
Once in the water, those without lifejackets or some other means of floatation, did 
not have long to live. As the Lusitania lurched toward the bottom, she took many in the 
water nearby down with her.  Others would succumb to exhaustion or hypothermia, lose 
consciousness, and drown.  Because of the remote position of the ship and the 
Admiralty’s failure to provide escort or increase patrols, the first rescue vessels were at 
least two hours away. Hypothermia would set in for all those in the water – regardless of 
floatation - within the hour of their submergence into the sea.   
It was a tragedy that might very well have been avoided entirely. While the 
captain and crew of the Lusitania knew well the general threat of a submarine attack 
along the route they were to travel, they were not given a warning of imminent attack 
from U-20 Captain Schwieger that had been customary and may have saved countless 
lives.  That custom had been ceased unilaterally by the Germans upon the British 
Admiralty’s announcement of a broad merchant ship armament program and along with 
defensive maneuvers that appeared to target specifically the vulnerabilities of German 
submarines.  The Admiralty had failed to anticipate the implications of its merchant ship 
armament program and astonishingly announced it before most ships were outfitted.  It 
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also failed to provide escort to a large and declared target as she moved into an area of 
known lethal submarine activity. 
The owner of the Lusitania, and the commercial interest to which the captain 
ultimately answered, was the Cunard Line. Cunard had instructed the captain to conserve 
fuel and refrain from top speed.  This conflicted with Admiralty instructions and 
contributed to the adverse course and steerage choices Turner ultimately made. These in 
turn, neutralized Lusitania’s advantages in avoiding a surprise submarine attack and 
allowed an inferior vessel with a skilled and motivated captain (U-20), to gain the tactical 
attack position it did against a much faster ship.  
Ultimately, it was Captain Turner’s seamanship that put Lusitania in harm’s way.  
Once there, he and his crew failed to acknowledge the approaching torpedo in time to 
take evasive action. Once struck, he delayed the abandon ship order and his crew failed to 
control the list or speed of the ship. Despite the known threat, over three quarters of the 
Lusitania’s lifeboat capacity was never deployed.   
The captain was one of only a few officers to survive.  He was washed off the 
deck, fully prepared to go down with his ship.  Unlike most of his passengers, Turner had 
a lifejacket on from the time he issued the abandon ship order until he was picked up in 
the water by one of six surviving lifeboats.  Although he endured the Mercy Inquiry, his 
actions and his judgment were only quietly criticized.  He would command only one 
other ship – a converted small merchant vessel that was also sunk in a German submarine 
attack – before he was retired to desk duty.  
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No matter how light-handed the Mercy Inquiry, its unambiguous verdict of 
German accountability for Lusitania’s elevated death count would later prove useful to 
the Allied recruitment effort.  In this indirect way, Lusitania’s captain and crew’s series 
of escalating failures would indirectly help mobilize the American war machine that 
ultimately turned the tide of World War I. 
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